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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 In April 2007, while adjudicating a dispute between Wachovia 
Bank and Michigan’s Commissioner of Insurance and Financial Ser-
vices, the United States Supreme Court effectively reversed two pre-
sumptions about federal preemption of state law that historically 
have guided the delicate balance between state and federal authority 
over consumer protection in banking services.1 The first presumption 
is that issues involving consumer protection are “quintessentially” 
matters of state (rather than federal) prerogative and are thus gov-
erned by state law unless specifically preempted by Congress.2 The 
second presumption is that national banks are subject to “nondis-
criminatory laws of general application” of the states where they are 
                                                                                                                     
 ∗ Associate Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law, Minneapolis, 
MN. B.A. Yale University; J.D. Columbia University School of Law. This Article is based 
on presentations given at the Financial Institutions and Consumer Financial Services Sec-
tion Meeting, Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting, in Washington, D.C., 
in January 2006 and at a Conference on Federal Preemption in the Financial Institutions 
Arena, Texas Tech University School of Law, Lubbock, Texas in April 2006. I am grateful 
to the comments and insights from participants at both events, particularly Keith Fischer, 
Howell Jackson, Kathleen Keest, Patricia M. McCoy, Christopher Peterson, Elizabeth Re-
nuart, Heidi Mandanis Schooner, and Arthur E. Wilmarth. I am indebted to Tom Berg and 
Michael Paulsen for their generous insights on federalism issues. I also thank Erika Toft-
ness for her excellent research assistance. 
 1. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007). 
 2. Id. at 1581. 
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located, provided that those laws “do not ‘forbid’ or ‘impair signifi-
cantly’ national bank activities.”3 In Watters v. Wachovia, the first 
presumption was entirely negated, and the second presumption was 
essentially reversed. After Watters, consumer protection in banking 
services can no longer be considered to be primarily the province of 
state legislatures. Furthermore, national banks can be presumed not 
to be subject to any state law that hinders the efficient exercise of 
any of the banks’ powers. 
 This development is a dramatic turning point in a persistent 
struggle between the federal and state authorities for control over 
consumer protection regulation in the banking industry. This strug-
gle is a particularly complicated one because it plays out on two very 
different planes. On one level, the struggle is over who should deter-
mine the degree and content of legal protection afforded to individual 
consumers. Should the federal government establish a uniform level 
of consumer protection with regard to banking services? Or should 
individual states be permitted to establish nonuniform, state-specific 
levels of consumer protection for their own citizens? On another lev-
el, the struggle is over who should determine the degree and content 
of legal regulation applicable to the various kinds of banks operating 
within a particular state. A unique characteristic of the American 
banking industry is what is commonly referred to as the “dual bank-
ing system”—two parallel systems of banks operating side by side.4 
One system is the state banking system, comprised of banks char-
tered and primarily regulated by state banking authorities.5 The oth-
er is the national banking system, comprised of banks chartered and 
primarily regulated by federal banking authorities.6 Over the years, 
state banks have become subject to increasing amounts of federal 
regulation, while national banks have become increasingly immune 
from state regulation. The reversal of presumptions about the appli-
cability of state consumer credit laws has played a significant role in 
this growing imbalance. 
 With the recent public spotlight on abusive lending practices and 
their effect on consumers in both the home mortgage7 and credit card 
                                                                                                                     
 3. Id. at 1574. 
 4. See generally Kenneth E. Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competi-
tion in Regulation, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1977) (classic article discussing the evolution and 
theoretical justifications for dual banking system).   
 5. Id. at 3. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Edmund L. Andrews, In Reversal, Fed Acts to Tighten Mortgage Rules, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2007, at A1 (describing regulatory activity in the wake of the collapse of 
the subprime lending market in fall 2007); Stacy Kaper, Benign? Many Say Schumer Bill 
Would Bring Drastic Changes, AM. BANKER, May 8, 2007, at 1 (discussing legislation pro-
posed by three Senate Banking Committee members to increase regulation of subprime 
mortgage lending); Stacy Kaper, Schumer Fix in Subprime: Refi Fund, Tighter Regs, AM. 
BANKER, May 4, 2007, at 1 (same); Stacy Kaper, Trepidation All Around as Anti-Predator 
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lending areas,8 the possibility of federal legislation addressing con-
sumer credit issues is more realistic now than it has been for dec-
ades.9 After the Watters ruling, it is clear that the courts will not pro-
vide any adjustments or corrections to the current balance of power 
in this area. The current congressional focus on consumer credit is-
sues thus presents a particularly timely opportunity for a principled 
consideration of the appropriate balance of state and federal power 
with respect to consumer banking services, taking into account the 
policy considerations relevant to both planes of activity—the protec-
tion of consumers of banking services and the continued vitality of 
the dual banking system. This Article will provide a framework for 
such a principled consideration, proposing a new paradigm for regu-
lation of consumer banking services that uses the mechanism of pre-
emption to protect consumers while respecting and preserving the vi-
tality of the dual banking system. 
 A careful analysis of the evolution of the arguments for federal 
preemption of state banking laws supports this new perspective on 
preemption. This analysis reveals a need to rethink the relationships 
among three distinct developments in the market for consumer bank-
ing services over the past few decades. During this time, the enact-
ment of significant federal consumer credit legislation and the in-
creasingly aggressive preemption of state consumer regulation 
                                                                                                                     
Push Rolls On, AM. BANKER, Mar. 21, 2007, at 1 (discussing a growing sense in Congress 
that legislation is necessary to address the subprime market crisis). 
 8. Joe Adler, Card Rules Have Fed, Lawmakers Far Apart: Where Central Bank 
Would Boost Disclosure, Bills Seek Bans, AM. BANKER, May 29, 2007, at 1 (summarizing 
seven bills pending in Congress to regulate credit card loans); Stacy Kaper, Support for 
Credit Card Rulemaking Beyond Fed, AM. BANKER, June 8, 2007, at 1 (describing House 
Financial Services Financial Institutions Subcommittee hearing on June 7, 2007 in which 
the possibility of substantive federal credit card regulation was considered).  
 9. Indeed, in a recent letter to the heads of the federal banking regulatory agencies, 
House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank and House Energy and 
Commerce Committee Chairman John Dingell cited, among other things, the Watters deci-
sion as one of the recent “developments bring[ing] into sharp relief an urgent need to re-
think the way in which our financial regulators approach consumer protection.” Joe Adler, 
In Brief: FTC to Gain More Authority?, AM. BANKER, May 14, 2007, at 19; see also Stacy 
Kaper, A Vote Without a Resolution: Provisions in Mortgage Bill Remain in the Air, AM. 
BANKER, Nov. 7, 2007, at 1 (summarizing legislative proposals being considered in wake of 
the collapse of the subprime mortgage market in the fall of 2007). Proposals introduced in 
the 110th Congress include: Credit Card Reform Act of 2008, S. 2753, 110th Cong. (2008); 
Credit Card Minimum Payment Notification Act of 2008, S. 2542, 110th Cong. (2008); Stop 
Unfair Practices in Credit Cards Act of 2007, S. 1395, 110th Cong. (2007); Borrower’s Pro-
tection Act of 2007, S. 1299, 110th Cong. (2007); Stopping Mortgage Transactions Which 
Operate to Promote Fraud, Risk, Abuse, and Underdevelopment Act, S. 1222, 110th Cong. 
(2007); Fair and Justifiable Credit Card Interest Rate Act of 2008, H.R. 5988, 110th Cong. 
(2008); Credit Cardholders’ Bill of Rights Act of 2008, H.R. 5244, 110th Cong. (2008); 
Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2007, H.R. 3915, 110th Cong. (2007); 
Universal Default Prohibition Act of 2007, H.R. 2146, 110th Cong. (2007); Credit Card 
Minimum Payment Warning Act of 2007, S. 1176, 110th Cong. (2007); Credit Card Ac-
countability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2007, H.R. 1461, 110th Cong. (2007); Con-
sumer Overdraft Protection Fair Practices Act, H.R. 946, 110th Cong. (2007). 
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through the operation of federal banking laws have increasingly fed-
eralized consumer protection laws related to banking services. Over 
this same time period, the content of most consumer credit regula-
tion has shifted from substantive restrictions on particular credit 
terms to disclosure requirements. Also during the same time period, 
the consumer credit market has become an increasingly national ra-
ther than regional market. Although these three developments—
federalization of consumer lending laws, substantive deregulation of 
consumer credit, and nationalization of the consumer lending mar-
ket—certainly have had causal relationships with each other over 
the past decades, they are not necessarily linked. The critics of the 
expansion of federal preemption have not fully appreciated the vary-
ing effects of these three developments on the two concerns at is-
sue—consumer protection and the dual banking system. A clearer 
understanding of the relationship among them, I argue, could open 
the door to innovative and effective approaches to consumer credit 
regulation within the framework of a strong dual banking system. 
 In Part II of this Article, I describe the historical evolution of con-
sumer protection in the banking industry from primarily a matter of 
state law to primarily a matter of federal law. This evolution oc-
curred in three stages. The first stage was a gradual expansion of the 
preemptive effect of a federal usury statute for national banks 
through a combination of actions by federal banking regulatory agen-
cies and case law. The second stage was the development of a broad 
theoretical framework for federal preemption of state banking law 
based not on a particular federal statute, but rather on a theory of 
congressional intent to permit national banks to provide consistent 
banking services nationwide, without any interference from inconsis-
tent state regulations. The third stage was the validation of that 
broad theory of federal preemption by the Supreme Court in Watters. 
After illustrating this historical evolution, I demonstrate how the re-
versal of the historic presumptions has recently played itself out in 
the context of the struggle between state and federal regulation of 
bank-issued gift cards, culminating in the first citation of Watters by 
a court.10 
 In Part III of this Article, I analyze the effects of the federaliza-
tion of consumer protection law in the banking industry. I challenge 
the proposition reflected in recent scholarship in this area suggesting 
that federalization of consumer protection law always and necessar-
ily entails deregulation of consumer protection law by unbundling 
the three trends in consumer credit regulation noted above—
federalization of consumer lending laws, substantive deregulation of 
                                                                                                                     
 10. See SPGGC, LLC v. Ayotte, 488 F.3d 525, 532 (1st Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. 
Ct. 1258 (2008). 
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consumer credit, and nationalization of the consumer lending mar-
ket. Nevertheless, I argue that Watters’ reversal of the presumption 
of preemption of state consumer protection laws will have significant 
adverse effects on the vitality of the dual banking system. I analyze a 
recent shift in the tenor of arguments for the preservation of the dual 
banking system. When bank powers were at stake, the argument 
most often asserted was one based on the effectiveness of competition 
to produce the best banking system; now that consumer protection 
laws are at stake, a different argument, based on the principle of 
subsidiarity, is increasingly being articulated. I argue that, while 
both of these arguments are valid, the subsidiarity-based argument 
asserted in the consumer protection context is likely to be more per-
suasive in convincing Congress to intervene to address the current 
imbalance between national and state banks that endangers the vi-
tality of the dual banking system.  
 Finally, in Part IV, I suggest a practical way to preserve such a 
balance, inspired by a recent proposal before the primary federal 
regulator of state-chartered banks, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC), to assert on behalf of state-charted banks some 
of the same wide-ranging preemption powers currently being as-
serted by the primary regulator of nationally-chartered banks, the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), on behalf of nation-
ally-chartered banks.11 Assertion of such powers on behalf of state 
banks is arguably necessary to maintain a healthy and vital dual 
banking system in the United States. However, it is not legally justi-
fiable under current laws. Redress of this imbalance would require 
action by Congress, including a partial reversal of Watters. Congress 
might choose to harness the prodigious power of preemption by giv-
ing it some regulatory content at the federal level; or, it might 
achieve the same effect, and at the same time preserve the vitality of 
the dual banking system, by preserving a role for states in providing 
regulatory content to preemption by state banks. 
II.   THE REVERSAL OF HISTORICAL PREEMPTION PRESUMPTIONS FOR 
NATIONAL BANKS 
A.   The First Stage: Preemption by Expansion of the Exportation 
Doctrine.12 
 The gradual reversal of presumptions about federal versus state 
regulation of consumer banking issues tracks the development of in-
                                                                                                                     
 11. See infra notes 272-74 and accompanying text. 
 12. The following section summarizes and updates the more detailed account of the 
evolution of the OCC’s preemption position with respect to the Exportation Doctrine set 
forth in Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine 
and Its Effect on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518 (2004). 
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terstate banking in the United States. As long as banks limited their 
operations to the physical borders of the states in which they were 
headquartered, other states’ laws were not important to them. How-
ever, as nationwide interstate banking developed, the inconsistency 
of various state regulatory schemes became more of an operational 
obstacle to national banks, leading to an almost total preemption of 
state laws for national banks.   
 The first stage in this process involved increasingly expansive in-
terpretations by the courts and the OCC of one federal statute—
section 85 of the National Bank Act.13 Section 85 gives a national 
bank the power to charge 
interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State [or] Territory . 
. .  where the bank is located . . . and no more, except that where 
by the laws of any State a different rate is limited for banks organ-
ized under State laws, the rate so limited shall be allowed for [na-
tional banks] organized or existing in any such State.14 
 The “Most Favored Lender Doctrine,” first articulated by the Su-
preme Court in Tiffany v. National Bank of Missouri,15 interpreted 
Section 85 to permit national banks to take advantage of the most 
favorable interest rates provided to any type of lender under the laws 
of the state where the bank was located.16 This doctrine was devel-
oped in a series of cases in which national banks successfully argued 
that they should be able to charge particularly favorable rates avail-
able to various types of lenders under state laws.17 
 However, as banks began to expand their operations across state 
lines, the power to disregard various state laws became a more sig-
nificant advantage. The most significant such power for national 
banks was the power given to them under the “Exportation Doctrine” 
to export the interest rate permitted by the state in which they are 
located to other states. The Exportation Doctrine was articulated by 
the Supreme Court in Marquette National Bank v. First of Omaha 
Service Corp.18 In that case, a national bank located in Minnesota 
challenged the power of a national bank located in Nebraska to offer 
credit card loans to residents of Minnesota at interest rates permit-
ted under Nebraska law, but usurious under Minnesota law.19 The 
                                                                                                                     
 13. National Bank Act, ch. 106, § 30, 13 Stat. 99, 108 (1864) (codified as amended at 
12 U.S.C. § 85 (2000)). Section 85 has been amended a number of times, as described in de-
tail in William G. Bornstein, Comment, Extension of the Most Favored Lender Doctrine 
Under Federal Usury Law: A Contrary View, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1077, 1080-82 (1981-1982).  
 14. Id. 
 15. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409 (1873).  
 16. Id. at 413. 
 17. See Schiltz, supra note 12, at 545 n.122 (listing cases in which the Most Favored 
Lender Doctrine was developed). 
 18. 439 U.S. 299 (1978). 
 19. Id. at 301-02. 
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Court interpreted Section 85 to permit the Nebraska bank to “export” 
the higher rates into Minnesota; Minnesota’s usury law was pre-
empted by the federal law that allowed the Nebraska bank to charge 
rates legal in Nebraska.20 
 A significant factor in the Court’s analysis was the fact that the 
Nebraska bank itself had no physical presence in Minnesota.21 Ne-
braska, the state of the bank’s charter address and the only state in 
which it had any offices or branches, was the only state in which the 
bank could be considered to be “located” for purposes of Section 85. 
The Nebraska bank was reaching borrowers in Minnesota by mail or 
through agents, rather than by branch activity.22 Indeed, at the time 
of the Marquette decision banks did not have the power to maintain 
branches in states other than the states in which they were head-
quartered. Not until the enactment of the Riegle-Neal Interstate 
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (“Riegle-Neal”)23 six-
teen years later did Congress give national banks the power to 
branch across state lines.  
 In those interim sixteen years, though, banks increasingly en-
gaged in interstate banking by establishing physical presences that 
stopped short of meeting the statutory definition of branches.24 Dur-
ing this period, the OCC promulgated a series of interpretations sup-
porting the national banks’ position that their growing physical pres-
ence in the various states into which they were “exporting” interest 
rates did not mean the banks were “located” in those states.25 The 
banks continued to be “located,” for purposes of Section 85, in the 
state listed as their charter headquarters. During this same time pe-
riod, large credit card issuers began to realize the advantage of es-
tablishing “locations” for their credit card operations in banks char-
tered in states with generous usury laws (such as South Dakota, De-
laware, and Utah),26 allowing them to preempt the usury laws of all 
the other states in which they might solicit customers. 
 Riegle-Neal did not directly address how the presence of a legiti-
mate branch in a state into which a bank wanted to export another 
state’s interest rate might affect the Marquette analysis. Instead, 
                                                                                                                     
 20. Id. at 313. 
 21. Schiltz, supra note 12, at 546-47. Marquette Bank named as defendants in the lit-
igation Omaha Service Corp., a subsidiary of the Nebraska Bank organized under the laws 
of Nebraska and qualified to do business in Minnesota, and the Credit Bureau of St. Paul, 
a corporation organized under the laws of Minnesota not related to the Omaha Bank. 
These two corporations apparently solicited the merchants and cardholders, respectively, 
for Omaha Bank’s credit card program in Minnesota. Marquette, 439 U.S. at 304-05. 
 22. Marquette, 439 U.S. at 311.  
 23. Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2000)). 
 24. Schiltz, supra note 12, at 549-53. 
 25. Id. at 549-52. 
 26. Id. at 552-53. 
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Riegle-Neal states only that “[n]o provision of this title . . . shall be 
construed as affecting the applicability of [Section 85].”27 The OCC 
promptly promulgated an Interpretative Letter, IL 822, in which it 
asserted that a bank’s power under Marquette to export its head-
quarter state’s interest rate laws “is not defeated simply because a 
bank has a branch in the state where the borrower resides.”28 Fur-
thermore, the OCC asserted that Riegle-Neal gave national banks 
the power to export the interest rate either of the state where the 
bank is headquartered or of the state where the bank has a branch, 
depending on how much of the lending activity is conducted in 
each location.29 
 IL 822 thus represented a dramatic expansion of preemption pow-
er by the OCC. It went significantly further than the Supreme Court 
in Marquette by permitting a national bank to choose its “location” 
for purposes of Section 85 from among any of the states in which it 
has either a bank charter or a branch. Under Marquette, a national 
bank could preempt the laws of forty-nine states, but only through 
the application of the laws of one state—the state of its headquar-
ters. Under IL 822, a national bank could theoretically establish 
branches in fifty different states and take advantage of particular 
advantageous laws for particular types of loans in each state to pre-
empt the laws of forty-nine other states. 
 A 2006 Supreme Court decision concerning a national bank’s “lo-
cation” for purposes of determining citizenship for federal court di-
versity jurisdiction purposes contains dicta supporting the OCC’s po-
sition. In Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt,30 the Court held that, for 
purposes of establishing federal court jurisdiction based on diversity 
of citizenship, a national bank was “located” in (and thus a citizen of) 
only the state designated in its charter as its headquarters location, 
                                                                                                                     
 27. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, § 111, Pub. 
L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2000)). 
 28. OCC Interpretative Letter No. 822, [1997-1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. 
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 81,265 (Feb. 17, 1998) [hereinafter IL 822]. 
 29. Under IL 822, the location from which the loan is “made” determines which state’s 
laws can be exported. To determine where a loan is “made,” the OCC divided the lending 
process into two categories—ministerial functions and nonministerial functions. Ministe-
rial functions—the strictly mechanical loan processing tasks such as providing applications 
or processing payments—were deemed to be irrelevant to the “making” of a loan. Three 
nonministerial functions—the decision to extend credit, the extension of credit itself, and 
the disbursal of the proceeds of a loan—were considered integral to the “making” of the 
loan. If all three of the nonministerial functions take place in the state where a bank has a 
branch, the loan is definitely “made” in that state. However, if fewer than all three of those 
functions are made in a state where a bank has a branch, the loan may be considered to 
have been “made” in the state where the bank is headquartered, rather than the branch 
state. IL 822, supra note 28, ¶ 90,261.  
 30. 546 U.S. 303 (2006). 
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rather than in every state where it had a branch.31 The Court first 
determined that “the term ‘located’ . . . has no fixed, plain meaning” 
under the National Bank Act.32 Indeed, the Court characterized the 
term as “a chameleon word; its meaning depends on the context in 
and purpose for which it is used.”33 Focusing on the particular con-
text and purpose for which this statute was being used, the Court 
reasoned that national banks should be treated analogously to corpo-
rate citizens conducting business in more than one state; they are not 
deemed to be citizens of every state in which they operate, but rather 
of their state of incorporation or principal place of business.34 For a 
national bank, the determinative “location” was held to be the state 
of its charter address.35 
 In determining that the term “located” is capable of having more 
than one meaning under the National Bank Act, the Court carefully 
examined the various provisions of the National Bank Act in which 
the term “located” is used and the meanings attached to it. The Court 
noted that in some provisions the term “unquestionably refers to a 
single place: the site of the banking association’s designated main of-
fice.”36 In other provisions, the Court noted that term “apparently re-
fers to or includes branch offices.”37 Among the provisions singled out 
as supportive of the latter interpretation, the Court included Section 
85, specifically noting the construction given to it by the OCC in 
IL 822.38  
 Although it might be tempting to dismiss this as mere dicta, Su-
preme Court dicta is not easily dismissed. Lower federal courts gen-
erally accord substantial weight to Supreme Court dicta if it is “care-
fully considered.”39 Since the OCC interpretation in IL 822 was spe-
cifically considered by the Supreme Court and identified as support-
ing the particular interpretations of banking law cited by the Court 
in its opinion, it was arguably “carefully considered.” At the very 
least, it will be accorded weight beyond that generally accorded to 
                                                                                                                     
 31. Id. at 313. Additionally, 28 U.S.C. § 1348 (2000) provides that, for purposes of di-
versity jurisdiction, national banks are “deemed citizens of the States in which they are re-
spectively located.” 
 32. Schmidt, 546 U.S. at 313. 
 33. Id. at 318. 
 34. Id. at 317. 
 35. Id. at 313. 
 36. Id. at 313 (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 52, 55, 75, 182 (2000)). 
 37. Id.at 313-14 (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 36(j), 85, 92 (2000)). 
 38. Id. 
 39. In Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 298 n.3 (4th Cir. 2004), the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a party’s dismissal of its opponent’s arguments based 
solely on its characterization as “dicta.” The court explained, “[A]s we and our sister cir-
cuits have frequently noted, with ‘inferior [c]ourt[s]’ . . . ‘that argument carries no weight 
since carefully considered language of the Supreme Court, even if technically dictum, gen-
erally must be treated as authoritative.’ ” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Sierra Club 
v. E.P.A., 322 F.3d 718, 724 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
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dicta by other federal courts. The OCC’s broad interpretation of “lo-
cated” for purposes of Section 85 preemption is thus likely to be up-
held. 
 During the same time period that the Exportation Doctrine ex-
panded in the geographic sense through the definition of “located,” it 
also expanded along another dimension—the scope of the credit 
terms considered to be exportable as “interest” under Section 85. 
This expansion succeeded through generous OCC interpretations 
that were repeatedly challenged in courts across the country and re-
peatedly sanctioned by the courts, culminating in the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A.40 The 
Smiley Court held that the OCC has the regulatory authority to de-
fine “interest” for purposes of Section 85.41 Applying the standard of 
deference to agency interpretations articulated in Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,42 the Court upheld as 
“reasonable”43 an OCC regulation that defined interest to include 
“among other things, the following fees connected with credit exten-
sion or availability: numerical periodic rates, late fees, not sufficient 
funds (NSF) fees, overlimit fees, annual fees, cash advance fees, and 
membership fees.”44 Smiley’s endorsement of the OCC’s definition of 
interest was another significant expansion of the preemption powers 
of national banks. It gave national banks the power to preempt nu-
merous potentially significant consumer protection laws that might 
be on the books of states into which the bank was exporting inter-
est rates.45 
 Thus, through aggressively expansive interpretations of two 
words in one federal statute—“located” and “interest”—national 
banks acquired substantial immunity from an increasing number of 
state laws. At the time of its adoption, Section 85 subjected national 
banks to, rather than excepted national banks from, the most signifi-
cant substantive form of consumer credit regulation that existed—a 
state’s limit on how much interest could be charged for loans to that 
state’s citizens. One hundred and fifty years later, Section 85 has be-
come a national bank’s most potent legal tool for ignoring not only 
state usury limits, but also laws limiting other significant credit 
terms such as annual fees, late fees, NSF fees, overlimit fees, cash 
                                                                                                                     
 40. 517 U.S. 735 (1996). 
 41. Id. at 747. 
 42. 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984). 
 43. Smiley, 517 U.S. at 745. 
 44. Id. at 740 (quoting 61 Fed. Reg. 4869 (Feb. 9, 1996) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 
7.4001(a) (2007))). 
 45. Indeed, the OCC has even argued that state disclosure laws could be covered by 
the preemptive reach of § 85 because complying with such laws could affect the interest 
rates charged. See Schiltz, supra note 12, 563-64 (discussing the use of this argument by 
the OCC in American Bankers Ass’n v. Lockyer, 239 F. Supp. 2d 1000 (E.D. Cal. 2002)). 
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advance fees, and even disclosure laws. This evolution took place 
through a process of aggressive agency interpretations of the federal 
law at issue, ratified by essentially unlimited judicial deference to 
those interpretations. 
 However, in developing its arguments during this stage, the OCC 
began to articulate a theory for national bank preemption of state 
laws that was even more robust than the theory underlying its ex-
pansion of Section 85. The OCC’s expansion of the Exportation Doc-
trine was based primarily on its authority to interpret arguably am-
biguous language in a specific federal law—Section 85—that has a 
preemptive effect. The Supreme Court in Smiley applied Chevron de-
ference to the OCC’s definition of interest only after concluding that 
“interest” was an ambiguous term in the National Bank Act (a fed-
eral statute that the OCC was specifically charged with administer-
ing) and that the OCC’s interpretation was reasonable.46 The more 
expansive, and exponentially more controversial, recent assertions of 
preemption power by the OCC were based on a different theory of 
preemption—a more general theory of “conflict preemption”—
pursuant to which the OCC has asserted the authority to exempt na-
tional banks from the reach of virtually all regulation by states. 
B.   The Second Stage: Setting the Groundwork for Comprehensive 
Preemption of State Consumer Protection Laws 
 In January 2004, the OCC promulgated a set of regulations that it 
claimed clarified issues that had arisen regarding the applicability of 
state law to national banks (the “Preemption Regulations”). In these 
regulations, the OCC applied the same template of a preemption 
claim to four separate categories of powers given by statute to na-
tional banks: the power to take deposits,47 the power to make loans 
secured by real estate,48 the power to make loans not secured by real 
estate,49 and the catch-all power to exercise all powers authorized 
under federal law as part of the “business of banking.”50 In each case, 
the regulation declared, “[e]xcept where made applicable by Federal 
law, state laws that obstruct, impair, or condition a national bank’s 
exercise of [powers authorized by Federal law] are not applicable to 
national banks.”51 The Preemption Regulations identified particular 
state laws applicable to the particular powers that are explicitly pre-
                                                                                                                     
 46. Smiley, 517 U.S. at 739-45. 
 47. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4007 (2007). 
 48. Id. § 34.4. 
 49. Id. § 7.4008. 
 50. Id. § 7.4009. 
 51. Id. §§ 7.4007(b)(1), 7.4008(c)(1), 7.4009(b); cf. § 34.4(a) (worded slightly differ-
ently). 
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empted, such as disclosure requirements,52 the ability of the bank to 
require insurance for collateral,53 and credit terms.54 The Preemption 
Regulations also offered a list of state laws that were presumed not 
to be inconsistent with the powers of national banks and thus appli-
cable to national banks, but only “to the extent that they only inci-
dentally affect the exercise of national bank powers.”55 These in-
cluded laws governing contracts, torts, criminal law, homestead laws 
for real estate loans, rights to collect debts, acquisition and transfer 
of property, taxation, zoning, and “[a]ny other law the effect of which 
the OCC determines to be incidental to . . . or otherwise consistent 
with” the powers of national banks.56  
 When the OCC first published the Preemption Regulations for 
public comment, it noted some confusion with respect to the basis of 
its authority to preempt state law. The Supreme Court has identified 
three general ways in which the Supremacy Clause of the Constitu-
tion57 can operate to preempt state laws. The first is express preemp-
tion, which occurs when Congress expressly preempts state law in a 
federal statute.58 The second is “field preemption,” which occurs when 
Congress adopts a comprehensive framework of regulations that per-
vasively occupies that entire field, leaving no opening for state regu-
lation.59 The third is “conflict preemption,” which occurs when federal 
law and state law conflict; conflict can be found either if it is physi-
cally impossible to comply with both laws60 or if the state “law stands 
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full pur-
poses and objectives of Congress.”61 In proposing the Preemption 
Regulation, the OCC noted that “Our positions in some instances . . . 
have not clearly reflected whether we were employing an ‘occupation 
of the field’ or ‘conflicts’ approach, although our individual preemp-
tion decisions have more commonly reflected a ‘conflict’ type ap-
proach to preemption analysis.”62 The OCC suggested that the com-
prehensive federal system of laws governing the operations of na-
                                                                                                                     
 52. Id. §§ 7.4007(b)(2)(iii), 7.4008(d)(2)(viii), 34.4(a)(9). 
 53. Id. §§ 7.4008(d)(2)(ii), 34.4(a)(2). 
 54. Id. §§ 7.4008(d)(2)(iv), 34.4(a)(4). 
 55. Id. §§ 7.4007(c), 7.4008(e), 7.4009(c)(2), 34.4(b). 
 56. Id.  
 57. “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every 
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 58. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). 
 59. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
 60. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963). 
 61. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
 62. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 46,119, 46,123 (Aug. 5, 2003) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 & 34) [hereinafter Pre-
emption Proposal]. 
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tional banks is similar to that governing federal savings associations 
and that the OCC might be justified in asserting the same type of 
“field preemption” accorded to federal thrifts.63 Indeed, it specifically 
invited public comment on whether it should assert field preemption. 
 The invitation to comment on whether field preemption was ap-
propriate was issued most particularly for the portion of the proposed 
regulation dealing with real estate lending by banks.64 Indeed, most 
of the recent state legislative activity to combat predatory lending 
has focused on real estate secured lending, and thus most of the con-
flict has been between the states trying to enforce and the national 
banks trying to avoid such legislation.65 The OCC proposed a particu-
larly detailed set of arguments for its preemption authority with re-
spect to real estate lending by national banks based on the language 
of 12 U.S.C. § 371, the federal statute that authorizes banks to make 
real estate loans.66 By its terms, Section 371 authorizes national 
banks to make real estate loans “subject to . . . such restrictions and 
requirements as the Comptroller of the Currency may prescribe by 
regulation or order”67 and subject to another federal law requiring 
the federal banking agencies to adopt uniform regulations prescrib-
ing standards for real estate lending by financial institutions.68 The 
OCC suggested that “this authority arguably enables the OCC to oc-
cupy the field of regulation of national banks’ real estate lending.”69  
 However, when it issued the final Preemption Regulations, the 
OCC declined to assert field preemption, either for real estate lend-
ing or for any other portions of its regulation.70 Instead, the OCC ar-
gued that the U.S. Supreme Court, in Barnett Bank, N.A. v. Nelson,71 
had adopted conflict preemption as the appropriate standard for pre-
                                                                                                                     
 63. Id. at 46,129 n.91; see also Schiltz, supra note 12, at 604-17 (contrasting authority 
for field preemption asserted by the OTS with respect to federal savings associations with 
authority for field preemption asserted by the OCC with respect to national banks). 
 64. This invitation was specifically issued with respect to the real estate lending por-
tion of the Preemption Regulation, Preemption Proposal, supra note 62, at 46,124, and was 
suggested with respect to the more general portions of the Preemption Regulation. Id. at 
46,129 n.91. 
 65. See, e.g., Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,264 (Aug. 5, 2003) 
(preempting Georgia Fair Lending Act, which restricted the ability of lenders to charge 
certain fees on various categories of home loans). 
 66. Id. 
 67. 12 U.S.C. § 371 (2000). 
 68. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(o), amended by Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Conforming 
Amendments Act of 2005, Pub.L. No. 109-173, § 8(a)(29), 119 Stat. 3601, 3615 (2006). 
 69. Preemption Proposal, supra note 62, at 46,125. 
 70. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. 
Reg. 1904, 1910-11 (Jan. 13, 2004) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 & 34) [hereinafter Fi-
nal Preemption Rule]. 
 71. 517 U.S. 25 (1996). 
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emption questions involving national banking laws.72 Quoting Bar-
nett, the OCC explained that:  
In defining the pre-emptive scope of statutes and regulations 
granting a power to national banks, these cases take the view that 
normally Congress would not want States to forbid, or impair sig-
nificantly, the exercise of a power that Congress explicitly granted. 
To say this is not to deprive States of the power to regulate na-
tional banks, where (unlike here) doing so does not prevent or sig-
nificantly interfere with the national bank’s exercise of its pow-
ers.73 
The OCC argued that there was no single, settled formulation of this 
conflict standard in this particular context. It argued that its regula-
tion, which preempted all state laws that “obstruct, impair, or condi-
tion” a national bank’s ability to fully exercise its federally granted 
powers, was a justifiable articulation of this conflict standard for na-
tional banks—a “distillation of the various preemption constructs ar-
ticulated by the Supreme Court.”74 The formulation was aimed at 
conveying the following substantive point: “that state laws do not ap-
ply to national banks if they impermissibly contain a bank’s exercise 
of a federally authorized power.”75 
 The OCC’s preemption argument is that Congress adopted a set of 
laws with the purpose of establishing a national banking system that 
would operate “distinctly and separately from the existing system of 
state banks,”76 with long-range goals “including financing commerce, 
establishing private depositories, and generally supporting economic 
growth and development nationwide.”77 To accomplish these goals, 
the OCC argued, Congress specifically granted national banks the 
flexible authority found in 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) “to exercise ‘all 
such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business 
of banking.’ ”78 Congress also explicitly gave the OCC  
the fundamental responsibility of ensuring that national banks op-
erate on a safe and sound basis, and that they are able to do so, if 
they choose, to the full extent of their powers under Federal law. 
This responsibility includes enabling the national banking system 
to operate as authorized by Congress, consistent with the essential 
character of a national banking system and without undue con-
                                                                                                                     
 72. Final Preemption Rule, supra note 70, at 1910. 
 73. Id. (quoting Barnett, 517 U.S. at 33-34). 
 74. Id. The OCC cited specific Supreme Court opinions for each of the three terms 
used. Id. at 1910 nn.51-53. 
 75. Id. at 1910. 
 76. Id. at 1907 n.17. 
 77. Id. at 1907. 
 78. Id. 
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finement of their powers. Federal law gives the OCC broad rule-
making authority in order to fulfill these responsibilities.79 
In essence, the OCC argued that Congress specifically gave national 
banks flexible powers, with statutory language permitting the evolu-
tion of powers to facilitate the natural evolution of a national finan-
cial services market; additionally, Congress specifically gave the 
OCC flexible authority to adopt whatever regulations might be nec-
essary to ensure that national banks can exercise these flexible pow-
ers to the fullest extent possible.  
 The OCC noted that profound changes in the financial services 
marketplace over the past years have created a truly nationwide 
market for both consumer and commercial credit, for deposits, and 
for other financial services. The OCC highlighted three develop-
ments: (1) technological innovations, such as the Internet, that have 
expanded both the consumer’s market for financial services providers 
and the banks’ market for customers nationwide; (2) the erosion of 
legal barriers to interstate banking; and (3) the increasing mobility of 
society, leading to an expectation of portable and consistent financial 
relationships.80 The OCC explained that 
 These developments highlight the significance of being able to 
conduct a banking business pursuant to consistent, national stan-
dards, regardless of the location of a customer when he or she first 
becomes a bank customer or the location to which the customer 
may move after becoming a bank customer. They also accentuate 
the costs and interference that diverse and potentially conflicting 
state and local laws have on the ability of national banks to oper-
ate under the powers of their Federal charter. For national banks, 
moreover, the ability to operate under uniform standards of opera-
tion and supervision is fundamental to the character of their na-
tional charter. When national banks are unable to operate under 
national standards, it also implicates the role and responsibilities 
of the OCC.81 
 In short, the OCC argued that Congress has, over the years, cre-
ated a nationwide system of banking for national banks. The OCC 
has the authority to implement regulations to let them operate on a 
nationwide basis. Inconsistent state banking laws applicable in dis-
crete geographic pockets within a bank’s nationwide market interfere 
with the ability of national banks to fully exercise their authority to  
 
                                                                                                                     
 79. Id. (emphasis added). 
 80. Id. at 1907-08. 
 81. Id. at 1908 (second emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
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operate nationwide.82 Thus, under the conflict preemption standards 
articulated above, such laws “obstruct, impair, or condition” a na-
tional bank’s ability to fully exercise its federally granted powers uni-
formly throughout its national market and are thus preempted. 
 The OCC further asserted that its preemption arguments also ap-
ply to operating subsidiaries of national banks as well as to the na-
tional bank parent (even though the subsidiaries are state-chartered 
corporations) pursuant to a pre-existing regulation which provides: 
“Unless otherwise provided by Federal law or OCC regulation, State 
laws apply to national bank operating subsidiaries to the same ex-
tent that those laws apply to the parent national bank.”83 The OCC 
justified the extension of the Preemption Regulations to operating 
subsidiaries of national banks on the grounds that operating subsidi-
aries are nothing more than incorporated departments of the na-
tional bank itself.84 For purposes of accounting, regulatory reporting, 
and applying many federal statutory and regulatory limits, the sub-
sidiaries are consolidated with the parent bank.85 Thus, any power 
that the parent bank has to preempt state laws can be asserted by 
the bank through any of its operating subsidiaries.86 
 As a companion to the Preemption Regulations, the OCC also 
promulgated a regulation asserting that only the OCC has the power 
to exercise visitorial powers with respect to national banks or their 
subsidiaries and that state officials have no authority to exercise any 
visitorial powers with respect to national banks or their subsidiaries 
(including conducting examinations, inspecting their records, or 
prosecuting enforcement actions), except where specifically author-
ized by federal law (the “Visitorial Regulation”).87 The Visitorial 
Regulation was supported not directly with a preemption argument, 
but rather on the grounds that “[t]he OCC’s exclusive visitorial au-
thority complements principles of Federal preemption.”88 Indeed, the 
                                                                                                                     
 82. The OCC explained: 
When national banks are unable to operate under uniform, consistent, 
and predictable standards, their business suffers, which negatively af-
fects their safety and soundness. The application of multiple, often un-
predictable, different state or local restrictions and requirements pre-
vents them from operating in the manner authorized under Federal law, 
is costly and burdensome, interferes with their ability to plan their busi-
ness and manage their risks, and subjects them to uncertain liabilities 
and potential exposure. 
Id. 
 83. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006 (2007). 
 84. Final Preemption Rule, supra note 70, at 1905. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 (2007).  
 88. Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities; Bank Activities and Op-
erations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 68 Fed. Reg. 6363, 6368 (Feb. 7, 2003) (to be 
codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 28 & 34). 
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OCC argued that the Visitorial Regulation “would not have the effect 
of preempting substantive state laws, but rather would clarify the 
appropriate agency for enforcing those state laws that are applicable 
to national banks.”89 The OCC’s position was that its rule is an inter-
pretation of the federal law providing that “[n]o national bank shall 
be subject to any visitorial powers except as authorized by Fed-
eral law.”90 
 With the Preemption and Visitorial Regulations, the OCC expo-
nentially broadened the scope of a national bank’s immunity from 
state consumer protection laws in a number of significant ways. 
First, the OCC uncoupled the preemption argument from particular-
ized statutory grants of power. The authority for preemption of state 
law by federal law is not based on judicial deference to an agency’s 
interpretation of a particular statute, such as Section 85 or Section 
371. Instead, the authority for preemption of state law is based on 
the entirety of national banking laws, which evidence congressional 
intent to establish a national banking system within which national 
banks are granted a flexible set of incidental powers that evolve with 
the development of the banking industry. As a consequence of this 
uncoupling, the OCC could assert preemption for all banking powers, 
not merely for the lending activities governed by Section 85 or Sec-
tion 371. Second, the OCC established the ability to operate uni-
formly throughout the nation, without interference by inconsistent 
state laws, as a fundamental characteristic of the national bank 
charter. Third, the OCC jettisoned the principle that consumer pro-
tection laws are quintessentially matters of state law. Despite the 
fact that Congress in Riegle-Neal identified consumer protection as 
one of four areas of particular interest to states,91 the only state laws 
the OCC recognized as being presumptively applicable to national 
banks are those governing contracts, torts, criminal law, homestead 
                                                                                                                     
 89. Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. 1895, 1896 (Jan. 13, 2004) (to be co-
dified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7).  
 90. Id. at 1895 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 484 (2000)). The full text of this statute reads: 
 (a) No national bank shall be subject to any visitorial powers except 
as authorized by Federal law, vested in the courts of justice or such as 
shall be, or have been exercised or directed by Congress or by either 
House thereof or by any committee of Congress or of either House duly 
authorized. 
 (b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, lawfully author-
ized State auditors and examiners may, at reasonable times and upon 
reasonable notice to a bank, review its records solely to ensure compli-
ance with applicable State unclaimed property or escheat laws upon rea-
sonable cause to believe that the bank has failed to comply with such 
laws. 
12 U.S.C. 484 (2000). 
 91. 12 U.S.C. § 43(a) (2000). The other three areas identified in Riegle-Neal as being 
of particular interest to states were community reinvestment, fair lending, and the estab-
lishment of intrastate branches.  
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law, rights to collect debts, acquisition and transfer of property, taxa-
tion, and zoning—and even those are only applicable to the extent 
they only incidentally affect the exercise of national bank powers.92  
 As the icing on the cake, the OCC asserted that this aggressively 
expansive presumption position applies not only to nationally-
chartered banks, but also to state-chartered corporations wholly-
owned by these banks.93 And, finally, the OCC claimed that even the 
state laws that do apply to national banks cannot be enforced by 
state regulators; only federal regulators have visitorial authority 
with respect to national banks or their subsidiaries.94 
C.   Watters v. Wachovia: Vindication of the OCC’s Conflict 
Preemption Argument 
 In the years leading up to and following the promulgation of the 
Preemption Regulations, commentators disagreeing with the OCC’s 
aggressive preemption position have expressed increasing levels of 
frustration over the “phenomenal success” enjoyed by the OCC in ju-
dicial challenges to its incrementally more expansive assertions of 
immunity from state law for national banks.95 In Watters v. Wachovia 
Bank, N.A., the Supreme Court handed the OCC its most phenome-
nal success to date, ratifying essentially all of the OCC’s broad con-
flict preemption argument as outlined in the preamble to the Pre-
emption Regulations.96 
 Watters involved a challenge to the OCC’s assertion of federal pre-
emption of a state law requiring the operating subsidiary of a na-
tional bank to comply with state mortgage licensing laws.97 The sub-
sidiary at issue was Wachovia Mortgage Corporation (“Wachovia 
                                                                                                                     
 92. Supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 93. Supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text. 
 94. Supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text. 
 95. Keith R. Fisher, Towards a Basal Tenth Amendment: A Riposte to National Bank 
Preemption of State Consumer Protection Laws, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 981, 996 
(2006). Fisher identified four recent federal court decisions in which the OCC’s assertion of 
preemption for national banks had been upheld: Wells Fargo Bank of Texas, N.A. v. James, 
321 F.3d 488 (5th. Cir. 2003); Bank of Am. v. San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551 (9th. Cir. 2002); 
Bank of Am., N.A. v. Sorrell, 248 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (N.D. Ga. 2002); and Am. Bankers Ass’n 
v. Lockyer, 239 F. Supp. 2d 1000 (E.D. Cal. 2002), and four recent federal court decisions in 
which the OCC’s assertion of preemption power for national bank operating subsidiaries or 
the exclusive visitorial position had been upheld: Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Watters, 334 F. 
Supp. 2d 957 (W.D. Mich. 2004); Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 319 F. Supp. 2d 275 (D. 
Conn. 2004), aff’d on preemption issue, 414 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied 127 S. Ct. 
2093 (2007); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Boutris, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1162 (E.D. Cal. 2003); 
Nat’l City Bank v. Boutris, No. Civ. S-03-0655 GEB J, 2003 WL 21536818 (E.D. Cal. July 
2, 2003). More recently, Office of Comptroller of Currency v. Spitzer has added another ju-
risdiction to the list of those upholding the OCC’s exclusive visitorial position. 396 F. Supp. 
2d 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, Clearing House Ass’n v. Cuomo, 510 F. 3d 105 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 96. 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2006). 
 97. Id. at 1564-66. 
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Mortgage”), a corporation organized under the laws of North Caro-
lina and operating as a mortgage lender in Michigan.98 On January 1, 
2003, the ownership of Wachovia Mortgage was transferred from 
Wachovia Bank’s parent holding company, a North Carolina corpora-
tion,99 to Wachovia Bank, a nationally-chartered bank.100 A few 
months later, Wachovia Mortgage informed the Michigan Office of 
Financial and Insurance Services (OFIS) that, as an operating sub-
sidiary of a national bank, it was no longer subject to the provisions 
of Michigan law requiring non-bank operating subsidiaries of out-of-
state national banks to register with OFIS.101 OFIS objected to Wa-
chovia Mortgage’s surrender of its license, and Wachovia Mortgage 
and Wachovia Bank filed suit against the OFIS Commissioner, 
Linda Watters.102 
 Both of the lower federal courts that heard this case upheld Wa-
chovia’s position that federal banking law preempted Michigan’s reg-
istration requirements for operating subsidiaries of national banks.103 
Indeed, all of the circuit courts opining on this issue had reached the 
same conclusion.104 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari to consider two questions: (1) whether the OCC’s regulation in-
terpreting the National Bank Act’s limitation on visitorial powers 
over national banks to extend to operating subsidiaries of national 
banks was entitled to Chevron deference; and (2) whether the OCC’s 
equation of state-chartered operating subsidiaries of national banks 
with national banks themselves (for purposes of federal preemption) 
violated the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.105  
 This grant of certiorari was interpreted by many observers as a 
sign that the Court might be willing to impose some limits on the 
OCC’s aggressive preemption positions, particularly since there was 
no split in the circuits that needed to be resolved.106 The facts of the 
                                                                                                                     
 98. Id. at 1565. 
 99. WACHOVIA CORPORATION, RESTATED ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION (2002), avail-
able at http://www.wachovia.com/file/CorpGovArticlesofIncorporation2001.pdf. 
 100. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1565.  
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Watters, 431 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 2005); Wachovia Bank, 
N.A. v. Watters, 334 F. Supp. 2d 957 (W.D. Mich. 2004).   
 104. Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 127 S. 
Ct. 2093 (2007); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Boutris, 419 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 105. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 
1559 (2007) (No. 05-1342); Order List Granting Certiorari, Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 
N.A., 126 S. Ct. 2900 (June 19, 2006) (No. 05-1342) (mem.). 
 106. See Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP, U.S. Supreme Court to Review 
State Regulation of National Bank Operating Subsidiaries, 21ST CENTURY MONEY, 
BANKING & COMMERCE ALERT No. 06-06-21, June 21, 2006, at 2, available at 
http://www.ffhsj.com/siteFiles/ffFiles/060621.pdf; Todd Davenport, Wachovia Preemption 
Suit: Gauging the Implications, AM. BANKER, Dec. 4, 2006, at 4; Thomas P. Vartanian & 
Dominic A. Labitzky, Viewpoint: Preparing Post-Watters ‘Op Sub’ Strategies, AM. BANKER, 
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case present the underlying issues in starkly dramatic relief. The 
state-chartered corporation at issue obtained a national bank’s im-
munity from state law simply because its ownership was transferred 
from the corporate parent in a holding company structure to a na-
tional bank subsidiary. Is federal preemption of state law as a result 
of such corporate restructuring justified in the absence of a specific 
federal law, based on the OCC’s construction of a broad congressional 
grant of authority for national banks to provide consistent nation-
wide banking services?  
 However, rather than circumscribing the preemption powers of 
national banks, the Supreme Court decisively and dramatically vali-
dated the broad conflict preemption position underlying the OCC 
Preemption Regulations. A vigorous dissent107 argued in vain for the 
preservation of the historic presumption against preemption of state 
law except where expressly preempted by Congress, reminding the 
majority “that because federal law is generally interstitial, national 
banks must comply with most of the same rules as their state coun-
terparts,” except where the state’s “nondiscriminatory laws of gen-
eral application” either “forbid” or “impair significantly” the national 
bank’s exercise of its powers.108 The dissent found it “especially trou-
bling that the Court so blithely preempts Michigan laws designed to 
protect consumers. Consumer protection is quintessentially a ‘field 
which the States have traditionally occupied.’ ”109 The dissent argued 
that affirming those historic presumptions—and recognizing that 
Congress did not, in fact, expressly authorize preemption of state law 
with respect to operating subsidiaries of national banks—should 
have led the Court to the conclusion that the OCC had overstepped 
its authority in asserting preemption powers for operating subsidiar-
ies.110 By definition, though, the dissent’s arguments were not the 
ones that prevailed. 
                                                                                                                     
Mar. 2, 2007, at 11; Viewpoint: Electoral Tide, a Warning on Preemption, AM. BANKER, Dec. 
15, 2006, at 11; Ben Winograd, Briefs Filed in High Court Preemption Challenge, AM. 
BANKER, Nov. 7, 2006, at 1. 
 107. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1573-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion 
was written by Justice Stevens and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia. For 
some interesting observations about the general positions of the various Justices on pre-
emption issues (including the characterization of Justice Stevens as “the standard-bearer 
for voting against preemption”), see Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor 
Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1366 n.42 (2006). However, Issacharoff and 
Sharkey characterize Justice Scalia as representing the other extreme, finding more read-
ily for preemption, suggesting that the dissent in Watters presented a somewhat uncharac-
teristic alliance on these issues. Id. at 1367 n.42. 
 108. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1574. 
 109. Id. at 1581 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
 110. Id. at 1583-84. 
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 The majority opinion111 summarily rejected Watters’ arguments on 
both of the questions on which certiorari had been granted. The 
Court ruled that “the level of deference owed to the [OCC’s] regula-
tion is an academic question” because the regulation merely clarifies 
and confirms preemption powers expressly conferred by federal stat-
ute.112 The Court dismissed Watters’ Tenth Amendment argument in 
four brief sentences, with the conclusion that “[r]egulation of na-
tional bank operations is a prerogative of Congress under the Com-
merce and Necessary and Proper Clauses” and is therefore not a 
power reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment.113 
 The bulk of the Court’s opinion fleshed out what can only be char-
acterized as the broadest possible construction of the OCC’s general 
conflict preemption argument. Even before the creation of the current 
national banking system with the promulgation of the National Bank 
Act (NBA), the Court claimed that it “held federal law supreme over 
state law with respect to national banking” in McCulloch v. Mary-
land.114 The enactment of the NBA in 1864 established “the system of 
national banking still in place today,”115 a system that the Court took 
pains to describe as one which Congress expressly intended to be 
largely free of state interference. Indeed, the Court enshrined 
“[s]ecurity against significant interference by state regulators [as] a 
characteristic condition of the ‘business of banking’ conducted by na-
tional banks.”116 The Court characterized the national banking sys-
tem that Congress intended to establish with the NBA as “a system 
extending throughout the country, and independent, so far as powers 
conferred are concerned, of state legislation which, if permitted to be 
applicable, might impose limitations and restrictions as various and 
as numerous as the States.”117 The Court’s primary statutory support 
for this characterization was the section of the NBA reserving visito-
rial powers over national banks to the OCC.118  
 Although the Court emphasized that the real estate lending ac-
tivities at issue in this particular case are a category of the business 
of banking indisputably outside the jurisdiction of state regulation, it 
                                                                                                                     
 111. The majority opinion was drafted by Justice Ginsburg and joined by Justices 
Kennedy, Souter, Breyer, and Alito. Id. at 1563 (majority opinion). 
 112. Id. at 1572. 
 113. Id. at 1573. The dissent also rejected the Tenth Amendment arguments. Id. at 
1585 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a defense of these Tenth Amendment arguments, see 
generally Fisher, supra note 95. 
 114. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1566 (majority opinion) (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 
Wheat. 316 (1819)). 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. at 1571. This echoes the language in the OCC’s preamble to the Preemption 
Regulations. See supra text accompanying note 81. 
 117. Id. at 1568 (citing Easton v. Iowa, 188 U.S. 220, 229 (1903)). 
 118. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (2000), which states that “[n]o national bank shall be 
subject to any visitorial powers except as authorized by Federal law”). 
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emphatically declined to limit the scope of its ruling to such activi-
ties: “Beyond genuine dispute, state law may not significantly burden 
a national bank’s own exercise of its real estate lending power, just 
as it may not curtail or hinder a national bank’s efficient exercise of 
any other power, incidental or enumerated under the NBA.”119 
 Although the Court did not expressly cite the OCC’s Preemption 
Regulation,120 it adopted the Preemption Regulation’s articulation of 
the conflict preemption standard for national banks,121 ruling that  
[s]tates are permitted to regulate the activities of na-
tional banks where doing so does not prevent or signifi-
cantly interfere with the national bank’s or the national 
bank regulator’s exercise of its powers. But when state 
prescriptions significantly impair the exercise of author-
ity, enumerated or incidental under the NBA, the State’s 
regulations must give way.122  
The Court, like the OCC, cited its Barnett decision in support of 
this proposition.123 
 After thus affirming the broadest possible construction of the 
OCC’s general preemption theory for national banks, the Court then 
decisively rejected Watters’ arguments that these broad preemption 
powers should not be extended to operating subsidiaries of national 
banks.124 The Court described how the OCC in 1966 recognized the 
authority of national banks to conduct any business authorized by 
the bank itself through operating subsidiaries.125 For supervisory 
purposes, the OCC historically treated operating subsidiaries as a 
part of the parent national bank, rather than as separate corporate 
entities.126 The Court concluded that Congress ratified the authority 
and regulatory treatment of operating subsidiaries with the enact-
ment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA).127 GLBA au-
thorized national banks under certain conditions to affiliate with 
nonbank corporate entities conducting certain financial activities not 
directly authorized for national banks.128 GLBA distinguished these 
newly authorized affiliations from the affiliations traditionally au-
                                                                                                                     
 119. Id. at 1567-68 (emphasis added). 
 120. The Court did, however, cite the OCC Preemption Regulations preamble in argu-
ing that national banks should not be subject to multiple enforcement regimes of the vari-
ous states in which they operate. Id. at 1568 n.6. 
 121. See sources cited supra note 51. 
 122. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1567.  
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 1569. 
 125. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh)). 
 126. Id. at 1570 n.10. 
 127. Id. at 1570.  
 128. See generally PATRICIA A. MCCOY, BANKING LAW MANUAL § 4.03[3] (2003) (de-
scribing generally activities and regulatory limitations of financial subsidiaries). 
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thorized between banks and their operating subsidiaries engaged in 
traditional banking activities by exempting from the new regulatory 
scheme “a subsidiary that . . . engages solely in activities that na-
tional banks are permitted to engage in directly and are conducted 
subject to the same terms and conditions that govern the conduct of 
such activities by national banks.”129 
 After thus establishing a statutory foundation both for the author-
ity to operate through operating subsidiaries and for the OCC’s regu-
latory treatment of such subsidiaries as indistinguishable from the 
operations of the bank itself, the Court then stated: 
We have never held that the preemptive reach of the NBA extends 
only to a national bank itself. Rather, in analyzing whether state 
law hampers the federally permitted activities of a national bank, 
we have focused on the exercise of a national bank’s powers, not on 
its corporate structure.  And we have treated operating subsidiar-
ies as equivalent to national banks with respect to powers exer-
cised under federal law (except where federal law provides other-
wise).130 
The Court supported this claim with reference to two significant af-
firmations of the scope of national bank powers in which the entity 
conducting the activity was an operating subsidiary rather than the 
bank itself—the power to sell annuities131 and the power to offer dis-
count brokerage services.132 
 The Court rejected Watters’ argument that Congress’ failure to 
specifically include “operating subsidiaries” in the language of the 
statute denying states visitorial powers over national banks133 meant 
that Congress intended operating subsidiaries to be subject to such 
power, for two reasons. First, operating subsidiaries were not author-
ized by the OCC until decades after that statutory provision was 
written, and while operating subsidiaries have since “emerged as im-
portant instrumentalities of national banks,” Congress has not ob-
jected to the OCC’s treatment of them as functionally equivalent to 
the banks.134 Second, the Court again emphasized that GLBA’s dis-
tinction between the operating subsidiary, which is limited in opera-
tions to activities permitted to its parent bank, and all other affili-
ates is a ratification of the OCC’s conception of the operating sub-
sidiary as equivalent to the bank for regulatory purposes.135 
                                                                                                                     
 129. 12 U.S.C. § 24a(g)(3)(A) (2000). 
 130. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1570-71 (internal citation omitted). 
 131. NationsBank of North Carolina, N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 
251 (1995). 
 132. Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987). 
 133. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 134. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1571. 
 135. Id. 
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 Watters thus not only affirmed the substance of the Preemption 
Regulation, but it also unequivocally adopted the OCC’s theoretical 
framework for the broadest possible preemption powers for national 
banks. The Court located the statutory authority for federal preemp-
tion not in any particular Congressional grants of power, but rather 
in the entirety of national banking laws. As a consequence, this pre-
emption power could be asserted with respect to all national bank 
powers, whether incidental or enumerated. The Court identified the 
ability to operate uniformly across the nation without interference by 
state banking regulators as a characteristic of the national bank 
charter.136 Furthermore, the Court did not even deem the fact that 
the state laws being preempted were consumer protection laws wor-
thy of mention. 
 After Watters, it is no longer accurate to say that matters involv-
ing consumer protection in banking services are presumptively mat-
ters of state, rather than federal, authority. Furthermore, it is no 
longer accurate to say that national banks are presumed to be sub-
ject to state law unless specifically preempted by Congress; instead, 
national banks can be presumed to be exempt from any state law 
that infringes in any way on banks’ ability to offer banking services 
nationwide on uniform terms. These two historical presumptions un-
derlying the dual banking system have been reversed. The First Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, the first court to cite Watters, in the context of 
state bank regulation of gift cards issued by national banks, made 
evident the dramatic consequences of this reversal. 
D.   Case Study: Gift Card Guidance and Litigation 
 In August 2006, the OCC issued guidelines to national banks sell-
ing gift cards, stressing the importance of “sound disclosure practices 
to help ensure that consumers understand the gift card products they 
are purchasing and using.”137 Three days later, the American Banker, 
the daily newspaper of the banking industry, published an analysis 
of the reaction to these guidelines.138 The article reported that some 
in the banking industry opposed the new guidelines.139 The American 
Bankers Association claimed “that the guidelines were overly restric-
tive and would hurt national banks.”140 However, most other banking 
industry groups, such as the Consumer Bankers Association, Amer-
ica’s Community Bankers, and the Independent Community Bankers 
                                                                                                                     
 136. Id. at 1562. 
 137. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BULLETIN 2006-34, GIFT 
CARD DISCLOSURES at 2 (2006) [hereinafter GIFT CARD GUIDELINES]. 
 138. Stacey Kaper, Is Gift Card Guidance Preemption Precursor? AM. BANKER, Aug. 17, 
2006, at 1.  
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
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of America, “welcomed the guidance” as helpful clarification in an 
area rendered confusing by litigation.141 Consumer advocates, on the 
other hand, claimed that the guidelines were not strong enough, cha-
racterizing them as “ ‘extremely weak’ . . . allow[ing] banks to do any-
thing as long as they disclose it.”142 
 More interesting than these fairly predictable alignments of ar-
guments with respect to the content of the regulation, however, were 
the reactions of analysts to the strategic impact of this guidance. 
Most of the article focused on the effect this guidance would have on 
state laws governing gift cards, particularly state laws imposing more 
stringent restrictions on gift cards.143 The analysts, whether they ap-
proved or disapproved of the move, came to the consensus that the 
OCC took this step to assure that all inconsistent state laws would be 
preempted for national banks. One analyst explained: 
It’s very much analogous to what the OCC has done in all of its 
preemption decisions. . . . It defines a national standard that in-
cludes more consumer protection than the industry generally 
would like, but it is often less than is possible under certain state 
law and simultaneously creates a uniform framework . . . .144 
Or, in the words of a consumer advocate, “[t]he states were regulat-
ing this product. Now the OCC is virtually unregulating it.”145 
 The Gift Card Guidelines146 and their effect on litigation challeng-
ing federal preemption of state laws governing gift cards provide a 
paradigmatic example of the reversal of preemption presumptions in 
consumer protection regulation in the banking industry. They consist 
of federal regulation based on disclosure of terms rather than sub-
stantive regulation of terms. They involve a banking product other 
than a loan, representing an expansion of the preemption power be-
yond the lending context that served as the initial staging ground for 
preemption of state laws governing banking services. The preemptive 
authority of the Gift Card Guidelines is based on the broad conflict 
preemption argument laid out by the OCC in its Preemption Regula-
tion. SPGGC, LLC v. Ayotte,147 the first judicial opinion to cite 
Watters, confirmed this preemptive effect. 
                                                                                                                     
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. (quoting Edmund Mierzwinski, Director of Consumer Programs at the U.S. 
Public Interest Research Group). 
 143. See infra note 155. 
 144. Kaper, supra note 138 (quoting Karen Shaw Petrou, Managing Partner of Federal 
Financial Analytics Inc). 
 145. Id. (quoting Edmund Mierzwinski, Director of Consumer Programs at the U.S. 
Public Interest Research Group). 
 146. GIFT CARD GUIDELINES, supra note 137. 
 147. 488 F.3d 525, 532 (1st Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1258 (2008). 
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 The Gift Card Guidelines apply to bank-issued prepaid or stored 
value cards intended to be purchased by one consumer and given as a 
gift to another consumer.148 In contrast to gift cards issued by retail-
ers (which typically can be used only at those retailers and their af-
filiates), the bank-issued gift cards covered by these guidelines are 
associated with a card network like Visa, MasterCard, or American 
Express, and can be used at any merchant that accepts cards from 
that network.149 
 The Gift Card Guidelines do not impose any substantive restric-
tions on the features of such cards. Instead, they set forth the types 
of disclosures that the OCC expects national bank gift card issuers to 
provide purchasers and users of such cards. Basic information con-
sidered to be essential to the card users’ decisions about how to use 
the card should be put on the card itself, either directly or in the form 
of a sticker.150 Such information should include: the card’s expiration 
date; the amount or existence of any monthly maintenance, dor-
mancy, or usage fee; and a toll-free phone number or website address 
for inquiries about the card.151 The issuer should also provide addi-
tional information in a form designed to be passed on to the ultimate 
user of the card, in promotional packaging, or in a sleeve containing 
the card itself.152 The exact content of such additional disclosures will 
depend on the particular card’s features.153 Finally, the Gift Card 
Guidelines warn national banks to avoid using misleading marketing 
or promotional practices in connection with the sale of gift cards.154 
 This de minimus federal regulation of gift cards—requiring disclo-
sure instead of imposing restrictions on fees or terms—contrasts with 
the more substantive regulation of the terms of gift cards enacted by 
a growing list of states over the past decades.155 The states impose 
                                                                                                                     
 148. GIFT CARD GUIDELINES, supra note 137, at 1. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 2. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. The OCC suggests that the following types of information might be provided: the 
name of the bank issuing the card; other fees such as card replacement, balance inquiry, or 
cash redemption; whether and how consumers can obtain replacement cards; consumer li-
ability for unauthorized use; whether and how the card can be used at merchants such as 
gas stations and restaurants that may seek payment authorization in amounts greater 
than the amount of the purchase; when the issuer may refuse to authorize transactions on 
the card; the importance of tracking the remaining balance on the card; whether and how 
the card can be used in conjunction with other forms of payment; the process for redeeming 
cash balances; how to resolve consumer problems; and, when applicable, the issuer’s ability 
to revoke or change terms of the card. Id. at 2-3. 
 154. Id. at 3. 
 155. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7402 (2007) (gift cards must conspicuously 
disclose expiration dates in a way that is clearly visible prior to purchase); CAL. CIV. CODE 
§ 1749.5 (West 2008) (no expiration dates or fees, unless the balance of the card is $5 or 
less, in which case a maximum $1 per month fee is permitted so long as the card has not 
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varying types of substantive restrictions on gift cards. Some forbid or 
limit dormancy fees, other types of fees, or expiration dates. Others 
require specific formats and procedures for specific types of disclo-
sures.156 
 This pattern of substantive state consumer regulation contrasting 
with federal regulation limited to disclosure requirements is similar 
to the pattern observed in the regulation of consumer credit. And the 
pattern of judicial reaction to the states attempting to challenge the 
contrasting federal regulatory approaches is also similar, culminat-
                                                                                                                     
been used for twenty-four months and is reloadable); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 3-65c (West 
2007) (inactivity fees prohibited); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-460 (West 2007) (expiration 
dates prohibited); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-393 (West 2007) (must include the cards’ terms in 
the packaging and conspicuously print dormancy fees or expiration dates on the card); 
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 481B-13 (LexisNexis 2007) (cards may not expire within first two 
years of issue; service fees prohibited); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1025/10.6 (West 2008) 
(cards that do not have an expiration date or any post-sale fees will not escheat); IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 556.9 (West 2007) (no fees unless there is a written contract between the card 
issuer and the card holder); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1423 (2008) (no expiration dates 
shorter than five years and no service fees, except a one-time handling fee not to exceed 
$1); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-1319 (West 2008) (no expiration dates or fees within 
the first four years; restriction does not apply to cards processed through national credit 
card or debit service); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 75C (West 2007) (no expiration for 
the first seven years); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-108 (2007) (no expiration dates or fees; 
possessor can request cash for the remaining balance if it is under $5 and the original val-
ue was more than $5); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 598.0921 (West 2007) (no fees for the first 
twelve months; after twelve months fees may not exceed $1 per month); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 358-A:2 (2007) (for gift cards over $100, no expiration earlier than the date the 
funds escheat to the state; for those under $100, no expiration date); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
56:8-110 (West 2007) (no expiration dates or fees within twenty-four months; after twenty-
four months, no fee greater than $2 per month; does not include prepaid bank cards); N.Y. 
GEN. BUS. LAW § 396-i (McKinney 2008) (no fees prior to the thirteenth month of dor-
mancy); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-29-02, 03 (2007) (no service or maintenance fees; no expira-
tion date for six years); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.61 (West 2008) (no expiration date or 
service fees for two years); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 797 (West 2008) (no expiration date 
until five years after date of purchase and no service fees unless the remaining value is $5 
or less, the fee does not exceed $1 per month, there has been no activity for twenty-four 
months, the holder may reload, and the fee is printed clearly); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13-12 
(2007) (no expiration dates or fees); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-1-55 (2007) (no expiration date 
within the first year; fees permitted but must be disclosed on the certificate, envelope, cov-
ering, or receipt); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-29-135 (West 2007) (issuer is exempt from turning 
unused funds over to the state if the card has no expiration date or dormancy fee); TEX. 
BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.42 (Vernon 2007) (expiration dates and fees must be clearly 
disclosed at the time of purchase; does not apply to financial institutions acting as finan-
cial agents for the United States or Texas); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 2702 (2007) (no expira-
tion dates for three years); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-531 (West 2007) (must disclose expiration 
date and fees or provide a phone number or Web site where the information can be ob-
tained); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.240.020, 19.240.040, 19.240.100 (West 2007) (prohib-
its fees and expiration dates, except for a fee not to exceed $1 per month when the balance 
is $5 or less, the card has not been used in twenty-four months, the card is reloadable, and 
the fee is disclosed on the card; doesn’t apply to gift cards issued to a financial institution 
or subsidiary if useable by multiple unaffiliated sellers of goods or services).  
 156. See sources cited supra note 155; see also Sarah Jane Hughes et al., Developments 
in the Law Concerning Stored Value and Other Prepaid Payment Products, 62 BUS. LAW. 
229, 239-51 (2006) (summarizing the different ways states regulate gift cards). 
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ing in the first citation of Watters as support for preemption of a 
state’s substantive regulation.157 
 Beginning in 2004, the attorneys general of Connecticut,158 Massa-
chusetts,159 New Hampshire,160 and New York161 sued Simon Property 
Group (“Simon”) for violating state law restrictions on gift cards in 
connection with gift card programs with two national banks and a 
federal thrift.162 Simon is a Delaware corporation that owns and op-
erates shopping malls in thirty-six states across the United States.163 
In August 2001, Simon began selling Simon-branded Visa Giftcards 
(“Giftcards”) issued through Bank of America (“BoA”).164 In 2005, Si-
mon transferred its Giftcard program to U.S. Bank, N.A. (“USB”).165 
The district courts that heard the two lawsuits brought by the attor-
neys general of New Hampshire and Connecticut reached different 
conclusions on whether the state consumer protection laws were pre-
empted by federal banking law, based on differences in the particular 
legal entities involved in the litigation and the structure of the two 
Giftcard programs. 
 The Connecticut case was brought against Simon166 in connection 
with the BoA Giftcard program. The Attorney General alleged that 
Simon violated provisions of Connecticut law prohibiting the imposi-
tion of expiration dates and dormancy or inactivity fees on gift 
cards.167 The Connecticut District Court ruled that federal banking 
laws and regulations permitting national banks to issue stored value 
cards with expiration dates and to charge non-interest fees did not 
preempt Connecticut’s laws in this case.168 The court looked carefully 
at the particular contractual arrangement that Simon had with BoA, 
                                                                                                                     
 157. See SPGGC, LLC v. Ayotte, 488 F.3d. 525, 532 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 158. Complaint, State v. Simon Prop. Group, Inc., No. CV-04-4005355-S (Conn. Super. 
Ct. Nov. 15, 2004). 
 159. Complaint, Commonwealth v. Simon Prop. Group, Inc., No. 04-4993 (Mass. Super. 
Ct. Nov. 15, 2004). 
 160. Petition for Preliminary Injunction, Permanent Injunction, Restitution and Civil 
Penalties, Ayotte v. Simon Property Group, Inc., No. 04-E-431 (N.H. Super. Ct. Nov. 15, 
2004) [hereinafter Ayotte Petition]. 
 161. Verified Petition, State v. Simon Prop. Group, Inc., No. 400425/05 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Feb. 2, 2005).  
 162. The New York litigation settled, Hughes, Middlebrook & Peterson, supra note 
156, at 247, and the Massachusetts proceeding appears to have stalled. Judith Rinearson 
and K. Richard Foster, Prepaid Card Preemption Issue Under Scrutiny, 2006 J. PAYMENT 
SYS. L. 9 (2006). However, the Connecticut and New Hampshire actions resulted in the lit-
igation described in this section.  
 163. Ayotte Petition, supra note 160, ¶¶ 4 & 6. 
 164. SPGGC, LLC v. Ayotte, 443 F. Supp. 2d 197, 200 (D.N.H. 2006). 
 165. Id.  
 166. More accurately, against SPGGC, Inc., the corporate affiliate of Simon (organized 
in Virginia) that administers the operation of the Giftcard program. Complaint, supra note 
158, ¶¶ 4 & 7. 
 167. Id. ¶ 28. 
 168. SPGGC, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 408 F. Supp. 2d 87, 95 (D. Conn. 2006). 
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noting that BoA’s profit on the arrangement came solely from inter-
change fees from Visa in connection with each transaction conducted 
through a Giftcard.169 Simon received all of the monthly maintenance 
fees charged on the card.170 The Court reasoned that the plaintiff in 
this case, Simon, was not a national bank and did not acquire the 
status of a national bank merely by its close agency or business rela-
tionship with a national bank.171 Thus, Connecticut state law, as it 
applied to its Giftcard program, was not preempted by the NBA.172 
 However, the Court emphasized that this reasoning would not ap-
ply if the plaintiff had been a national bank (in this case BoA), ex-
plaining:  
the [Connecticut Gift Card Law (“CGCL”)] is a consumer protec-
tion law that regulates the sale of gift cards. The CGCL does not 
purport to regulate the conduct of national banks; if it did, it might 
be preempted by the NBA.  If the BOA was the plaintiff in this 
case, a different analysis might be required, but the BOA is not a 
plaintiff.  As a result, the protections of the NBA simply do not ap-
ply to [Simon], and therefore the CGCL, as applied against [Si-
mon], is not preempted by the NBA.173 
 In contrast to the Connecticut case, in the New Hampshire Gift-
card case, Simon’s national bank partner, USB, was a party to the 
litigation.174 The New Hampshire law also prohibited the imposition 
of expiration dates and dormancy or inactivity fees on gift cards.175 
The New Hampshire District Court, however, distinguished the pro-
gram at issue in this case from the program at issue in Connecticut, 
describing as “a critical factual difference” the fact that the issuing 
banks, rather than Simon, impose the various fees and establish the 
expiration dates on the Giftcards.176 In addition, the Court noted 
some other differences in the programs, including the fact that under 
the New Hampshire program Simon’s involvement was strictly lim-
ited to sales and marketing functions, and Simon was compensated 
                                                                                                                     
 169. Id. at 94. 
 170. Id.; see also Ayotte, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 200. 
 171. Blumenthal, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 94. 
 172. Id. at 95. 
 173. Id. 
 174. The Attorney General brought an enforcement action only against Simon, but U.S. 
Bank was permitted to intervene as a plaintiff in the declaratory judgment action brought 
by Simon. Ayotte, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 199. MetaBank, a federally-chartered thrift that is-
sued gift cards sold over the Internet, was another institutional partner of Simon. The 
courts deciding these cases resolved the preemption questions for the thrift in the same 
manner as they had for the national bank, but under the slightly different statutory 
scheme applicable to federal thrifts. Id. at 206-07; SPGGC, LLC v. Ayotte, 488 F.3d 525, 
534-36 (1st Cir. 2007). For a discussion of the relevant differences between bank and thrift 
regulation, see Schiltz, supra note 12, at 604-10. 
 175. Ayotte, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 201. 
 176. Id. at 205-06. 
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through a sales-based commission.177 Furthermore, Simon lacked the 
“authority to alter the terms of the Giftcards, the associated fee 
schedule, the substantive terms of the disclosures provided to the 
purchaser, or the terms and conditions of the contractual relation-
ship that arises between the consumer and the issuing bank.”178 
 In light of these differences in the programs, the New Hampshire 
Court concluded that 
the relationship between the issuing bank and the Giftcard con-
sumer is substantial, the terms of which are established by the is-
suing bank. Simon’s involvement in the marketing and sale of 
those Giftcards on behalf of the issuing banks does not alter or 
even attenuate that relationship. . . . Consequently, the terms of 
the relationship between the Giftcard consumer and . . . U.S. Bank 
. . . (including the fee schedule and provisions regarding expiration 
dates) are governed by federal banking law. State law, to the ex-
tent it purports to regulate the terms or essential aspects of that 
relationship, is preempted.179 
 The issue of extending national bank preemption privileges to 
third parties partnering with national banks exposed by the conflict-
ing opinions of the New Hampshire and Connecticut district courts 
has significant ramifications for other types of bank partnerships 
with nonbanks, such as cobranded credit cards.180 For purposes of our 
inquiry, however, the most interesting aspect of both opinions is the 
point on which they both agree. Both accepted the argument that the 
relevant state consumer protection laws were preempted by national 
banking law with respect to the national banks involved, and both 
supported their conclusions by reference to the OCC’s general articu-
lation of its broad conflict preemption position: that state laws that 
obstruct in any way a bank’s ability to exercise powers granted under 
federal law are preempted.181 Indeed, the New Hampshire Court 
made it a point to quote the following passage from the Connecticut 
                                                                                                                     
 177. Id. at 206. 
 178. Id.  
 179. Id. at 206-07 (citation omitted). 
 180. See, e.g., Hughes, Middlebrook & Peterson, supra note 156, at 249 (speculating 
about differences between cobranded credit card programs and retailer gift card programs); 
Schiltz, supra note 12, at 575-82 (describing and speculating about the validity of expan-
sion of scope of federal preemption of state consumer credit regulation to nonbank third 
parties). 
 181. SPGGC, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 408 F. Supp. 2d 87, 93 (D. Conn. 2006) (“[S]tate laws 
that obstruct, impair, or condition a bank’s ability to fully exercise its powers authorized 
under federal law do not apply to national banks.” (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 7.4009(b) (2004)); 
Ayotte, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 204 (“State laws that stand as an obstacle to the ability of na-
tional banks to exercise uniformly their Federally authorized powers through electronic 
means or facilities, are not applicable to national banks.” (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 7.5002 (c) 
(2006)). 
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court’s opinion in support of this conclusion, despite the conflicting 
results of the two rulings: 
Because the OCC explicitly authorizes national banks to charge 
[their] customers fees, any state law that impairs a national bank 
from exercising its federally authorized power to charge fees could 
arguably be preempted by the NBA. The rationale underlying that 
conclusion is that Congress has clearly expressed its intent for na-
tional banks to be regulated by federal authority. Complying with 
both laws could cause an irreconcilable conflict, because the OCC 
has ruled that, when it explicitly authorizes a national bank to ex-
ercise a power, a state may not infringe that authorization.182 
 The judicial endorsement of these general articulations of the 
OCC’s broad conflict preemption standards is particularly notewor-
thy because there is no specific federal law either authorizing or re-
gulating national bank issuance of gift cards. This is not a situation 
in which the OCC can rely on Chevron deference being applied to its 
interpretation of arguably ambiguous language in a federal law, as it 
did in expanding the scope of the Exportation Doctrine.183 National 
bank authority to issue gift cards is set forth in OCC regulations au-
thorizing national banks to offer “electronic stored value systems.”184 
Implicit in the authority to engage in this activity, according to both 
courts, was the “incidental” power to establish the terms and condi-
tions of such cards, including the imposition of charges and fees.185 
 Indeed, the New Hampshire court noted the absence of federal 
regulation of national banks’ gift card authority: “If there are to be 
any restrictions on fees associated with the Giftcards, or limitations 
imposed on expiration dates, they must come either from Congress or 
the federal agencies empowered by Congress to oversee national 
banks . . . .”186 Against this background, it is perhaps easier to under-
stand the reaction of the commentators187 to the OCC’s Gift Card 
Guidelines—released shortly after the two district court opinions 
were issued.188 The OCC provided some specific federal regulation of 
                                                                                                                     
 182. Ayotte, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 204 (alteration in original) (quoting Blumenthal, 408 F. 
Supp. 2d at 93-94). 
 183. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 184. 12 C.F.R. § 7.5002(a)(3) (2007). 
 185. Blumenthal, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 93 (noting that “[a] national bank may charge its 
customers non-interest charges and fees” (citing 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002 (2001)); Ayotte, 443 F. 
Supp. 2d at 204. 
 186. Ayotte, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 207.  
 187. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text. 
 188. Between the time that the Connecticut court issued its opinion and the time the 
New Hampshire court issued its opinion, the federal regulator of thrifts, the Office of 
Thrift Supervision (OTS), issued an opinion declaring that OTS regulation preempts state 
gift card regulation with respect to federal thrifts. Letter from John E. Bowan, Chief Coun-
sel, Office of Thrift Supervision (June 9, 2006), available at 
http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/5/56218.pdf. A few months later, the OTS issued additional 
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gift cards issued by national banks, even if that regulation was lim-
ited to general disclosure guidelines. This more specific regulatory 
scheme bolstered the judicial inclination to defer to the OCC’s gen-
eral articulation of its broad conflict preemption powers evidenced by 
the two existing opinions. 
 Indeed, when the First Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the lower 
court’s decision in the New Hampshire case a few years later in 
SPGGC, LLC v. Ayotte, both the Gift Card Guidelines and the Wat-
ters decision figured prominently in its analysis.189 In a de novo re-
view of the district court’s preemption determination,190 the First 
Circuit set out a two-step analysis. First, does a national bank have 
the power to issue stored-value gift cards with expiration dates and 
administrative fees and to market them through third parties?191 If 
so, does New Hampshire law limit a national bank’s ability to exer-
cise that power?192 The court found that there was “little dispute” 
over a national bank’s power to issued stored value cards with expi-
ration dates and administrative fees.193 It based its decision on an 
OCC determination that the issuance and sale of electronic stored 
value systems, like gift cards, was “incidental to the business of 
banking.”194 The court cited the Gift Card Guidance’s requirement 
that expiration dates and administrative fees in connection with such 
cards be disclosed as support for the fact that such features were au-
thorized.195 The power to engage third party agents to market and 
sell gift cards was found in explicit language from the NBA permit-
ting a national bank to “use ‘duly authorized officers or agents’ to ex-
ercise its incidental powers.”196 
 Next, the court considered whether New Hampshire’s law “frus-
trates the exercise” of the national bank’s power to issue gift cards 
with expiration dates and administrative fees and to use third par-
                                                                                                                     
guidance on gift card programs by federal thrifts, similar to the OCC’s Gift Card Guide. 
Memorandum from Scott M. Polakoff, Deputy Director, Office of Thrift Supervision to 
Chief Executive Officers (Feb. 28, 2007), available at http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/2/25254.pdf. 
 189. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals also upheld the lower court’s decision in the 
Connecticut case, while at the same time citing Watters in reaffirming that the Connecticut 
law would be preempted if the plaintiff were either a national bank or the operating sub-
sidiary of a national bank. SPGGC, LLL V. Blumenthal, 505 F.3d 183, 189-91 (2d 
Cir. 2007). 
 190. SPGGC, LLC v. Ayotte, 488 F.3d 525, 530 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 191. Id. at 531-32. 
 192. Id. at 532. 
 193. Id. at 531. 
 194. Id. at 531 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 7.5002(a)(3) (2006); OFFICE OF THE CURRENCY, OCC 
BULLETIN 98-31, GUIDANCE ON ELECTRONIC FINANCIAL SERVICES & CONSUMER 
COMPLIANCE 8 (1998). 
 195. Ayotte, 488 F.3d at 531. The court also noted that the OCC’s amicus brief sug-
gested that expiration dates might be required as a matter of sound banking practice. Id. 
at 531-32. 
 196. Id. at 532 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (2000)). 
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ties to market and sell them.197 The court rejected as “too formalistic” 
the argument that New Hampshire’s law does not conflict with any 
banking law because it regulates only Simon, a nonbank.198 Citing 
Watters, the court held that the relevant focus should not be on the 
legal entity that New Hampshire is trying to regulate, but rather on 
the activity that is being regulated—and that activity is a national 
bank selling gift cards with features authorized for national banks 
through a third party agent.199 Stressing that it is the bank, rather 
than Simon, that regulates the terms of the gift cards, the court con-
cluded that the activity being regulated is the bank’s activity rather 
than Simon’s marketing activity: 
Even if the [New Hampshire law] does not directly prohibit USB 
from engaging in such activity, it does so indirectly by prohibiting 
Simon from acting as USB’s agent. It would be contrary to the lan-
guage and intent of the National Bank Act to allow states to avoid 
preemption of their statutes simply by enacting laws that prohib-
ited non-bank firms from providing national banks with the re-
sources to carry out their banking activities.200 
 The court also rejected the argument that, since the federal law 
does not require gift cards to have expiration dates or administrative 
fees, there is no direct conflict between New Hampshire law and fed-
eral law. The court did not cite Watters, but rather relied on the 
Watters standard for preemption: “Because the New Hampshire [law] 
‘significantly interferes’ with USB’s statutory power, it is preempted 
by the National Bank Act.”201 
 Ayotte vividly illustrates the dramatic reach of Watters and the ef-
fect of its reversal of the two basic historical preemption principles 
that have guided preemption decisions in banking until now. First, 
the opinion did not mention that consumer protection issues are pre-
sumptively a matter of state, rather than federal, law. Second, the 
opinion applied the reversed presumption of whether state or federal 
law governs the activities of the national bank. Because New Hamp-
shire’s law was found to “significantly interfere” with a national 
bank’s exercise of an incidental banking power made specific only 
through OCC action, it was deemed to be preempted.202 States have, 
in fact, lost their power to impose standards of consumer protection 
on banking services—not just lending products, but all banking ser-
vices—that differ significantly from standards (or lack of standards) 
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 198. Id.  
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 200. Id. at 533. 
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imposed on national banks at the federal level.203 For national banks, 
at least, the efficient exercise of all of its powers on consistent, na-
tionwide terms trumps individual conceptions by any state govern-
ment of desirable levels of protection for its consumers. 
III.   ASSESSING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE REVERSAL OF THE 
HISTORICAL PREEMPTION PRESUMPTIONS. 
 The logic of the OCC’s broad conflict preemption position is com-
pelling. Congress clearly did establish the national banking system 
as a distinct alternative to the state banking system, and Congress 
has given the OCC fairly comprehensive authority to administer this 
national banking system. Although some particular statutes do defer 
to state laws to provide content to the federal laws applicable to 
banks,204 for the most part, national banks operate under a compre-
hensive set of federal laws and statutes. Furthermore, Congress did, 
fairly recently, specifically authorize the evolution of this national 
banking system into a truly nationwide banking system with the en-
actment of Riegle-Neal. The reality is that we do have a national 
banking system for which state borders are operationally meaning-
less. There is a logical integrity to the argument that, since Congress 
has authorized such a system and has given the OCC the authority 
to administer this system, the OCC should have the power to ensure 
operational uniformity within that system. Although the logical in-
tegrity of this argument does not necessarily extend to operating sub-
sidiaries, Watters has effectively ended debate on whether the state-
issued corporate charters of operating subsidiaries exclude them 
from this congressionally-established national banking system. Thus, 
absent congressional action, the Watters decision signifies the com-
plete preemption of state consumer protection laws for national 
banks and their subsidiaries.205  
                                                                                                                     
 203. Subsequent decisions supporting this conclusion include Rose v. Chase Bank USA, 
N.A., 513 F.3d 1032, 1036-38 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Watters in holding that claims that dis-
closures on convenience checks issued to credit card holders violated California credit card 
disclosure requirements were preempted by the National Bank Act); Martinez v. Wells 
Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C-06-03327 RMW, slip op. at 4-6 (N.D. Cal. July 31, 2007) (citing 
Watters in holding that a claim challenging servicing charges by a home mortgage lending 
subsidiary of a national bank under California’s state unfair and deceptive practices act 
was preempted by the National Bank Act); and Montgomery v. Bank of America Corp., 515 
F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1113-14 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (holding that claims challenging inadequate 
disclosure of fees for nonsufficient funds and overdrafts in checking accounts under Cali-
fornia’s unfair competition laws were preempted by the National Bank Act). 
 204. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2000) (allowing national banks to charge interest at rates 
permitted in the states in which the bank is located); 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (2000) (allowing na-
tional banks to branch within a state to the extent permitted by state laws); 12 U.S.C. § 
92a(a) (2000) (stating that fiduciary powers of national banks determined by state laws).  
 205. This logic appears to extend to the OCC’s assertion of exclusive visitorial powers 
as well. See Clearing House Ass’n, L.L.C. v. Cuomo, 510 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2007) (upholding 
the OCC’s Visitorial Regulation). 
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 Should Congress take any action to address this situation? Oppo-
nents of the OCC’s broad conflict preemption position assert two 
main policy arguments206 for why the uniformity argument underly-
ing the OCC’s position is not compelling enough to outweigh two 
competing values asserted by the states attempting to impose their 
own laws: providing effective protection to consumers within the 
state and preserving the vitality of the dual banking system. The 
weakness of the first argument and the strength of the second argu-
ment is made clear by assessing each argument against the backdrop 
of the evolution of the preemption position outlined above, paying 
particular attention to the interplay between the nationalization of 
federal banking markets, federalization of consumer banking law, 
and the deregulation of consumer credit laws. 
A.   Consequences of Federal Preemption of State Consumer Banking 
Laws for Consumer Protection 
 Opponents of the OCC’s broad conflict preemption position pre-
sent facially compelling arguments that preempting state laws will 
inevitably weaken the protections provided to consumers against 
abusive banking practices.207 These arguments take two different 
forms. One is the substantive argument that the content of consumer 
protection laws at the state level is more robust than the content at 
the federal level.208 The other is the procedural argument that the 
regulatory will to enforce existing laws is stronger at the state level 
than at the federal level.209 However, both arguments prove to have 
weaknesses when assessed in light of the three contemporaneous de-
velopments in banking services—development of national markets 
for banking services, federalization of banking regulation, and sub-
stantive deregulation.  
 The argument that federal consumer credit law is weaker con-
sumer credit law assumes that federal law necessarily entails de-
regulation. But this is not a logical inevitability. As the historical 
narrative of the federalization of consumer banking law laid out in 
the preceding Section demonstrates, it is entirely plausible to con-
clude that the federalization was motivated as much by—if not more 
than—the desire to support the nationalization of the consumer 
                                                                                                                     
 206. These arguments supplement the more specific statutory interpretation and fed-
eral agency authority arguments rejected time and time again by the courts, most dra-
matically by the Supreme Court in Watters. See supra Part II.C. 
 207. See, e.g., Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending: Unmasking 
the Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 68-72 (2005); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The 
OCC’s Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency’s Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the 
Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 348-
56 (2004). 
 208. See Fisher, supra note 95, at 991-93; Peterson, supra note 207, at 73.  
 209. See Fisher, supra note 95, at 993-94; Wilmarth, supra note 207, at 348-57. 
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banking market than by the desire to deregulate the consumer bank-
ing market. Indeed, the federalization through preemption of legal 
regimes historically reserved to the states is not unique to the bank-
ing market. Professors Issacharoff and Sharkey have documented a 
similar pattern of increased judicial deference to preemption argu-
ments based on support for uniform national commercial markets in 
the area of product liability law. They have noted “that the U.S. Su-
preme Court has, in preemption . . . cases, attempted to capture the 
considerable benefits that flow from national regulatory uniformity 
and to protect an increasingly unified national . . . commercial mar-
ket from the imposition of externalities by unfriendly state legisla-
tion.”210 
 Indeed, while it may be true that, in the recent history of legisla-
tive assaults on particular predatory lending practices, states have 
been more aggressive than the federal government,211 that has not 
always been the case. One only has to look at the table of contents of 
three popular law school casebooks to note that the bulk of what is 
considered “consumer protection” law today is federal, rather than 
state, law.212 The federalization of consumer law may have been ac-
companied by an overall loosening of consumer protection law;213 
however, that is not primarily because federal laws have explicitly 
preempted stronger state consumer protections laws—rather, the 
federal laws that were actually implemented by Congress were 
passed instead of hypothetically stronger state consumer protection 
laws that were proposed, but failed, at the state level. 
 The Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968,214 the “first modern 
consumer protection statute,”215 initially comprised only the Truth in 
Lending Act,216 but was subsequently supplemented by the Fair Cre-
dit Reporting Act,217 the Fair Credit Billing Act and the Equal Credit 
                                                                                                                     
 210. Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 107, at 1356; see also id. at 1360-65. In another 
article, Professor Sharkey focuses on the role of federal agencies in this preemption. Cath-
erine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federalization of Tort 
Reform, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227 (2007). 
 211. Peterson, supra note 207, 61-68. 
 212. See MICHAEL M. GREENFIELD, CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS xxix-xxxiv (2d ed. 1991); 
JOHN A. SPANOGLE ET AL., CONSUMER LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS xv-xxvi (3d ed. 2007); 
DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CONSUMER LAW xi-xviii (4th ed. 2006). 
 213. Peterson, supra note 207, at 97. 
 214. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000). 
 215. Edward L. Rubin, Legislative Methodology: Some Lessons from the Truth-in-
Lending Act, 80 GEO. L.J. 233, 234 (1991). 
 216. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r (2000). 
 217. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970), amended by the Consumer Credit Re-
porting Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 1681-1681t (2000)). 
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Opportunity Act,218 and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.219 
Each of these federal laws sets up an enforcement mechanism that 
defers enforcement to the federal agency with primary enforcement 
responsibility for that type of lender and preempts inconsistent state 
laws.220 This model for consumer protection law at the federal level 
was enacted by Congress around the same time that the National 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws was mounting one of its least 
successful uniform state law efforts—the Uniform Consumer Credit 
Code.221 It is true that the federal law focused on disclosure rather 
than on substantive regulation of credit terms. It is also true that the 
Uniform Consumer Credit Code would have imposed substantive re-
strictions on credit terms. However, Congress enacted the federal 
law, while the Uniform Consumer Credit Code largely failed to be-
come law, except for nonuniform variations in a handful of states.222 
The failure of the states to enact a strong uniform state consumer 
credit law paved the way for the federalization of consumer credit 
law. 
 The states’ failure in 1968 to generate a stronger, coordinated de-
fense of states as the most effective level at which to provide mean-
ingful consumer credit protection law laid the foundation for the cur-
rent environment, in which it is difficult to argue that the states 
should be accorded deference in conflicts between state and federal 
consumer protection laws on the basis that their laws are stronger 
than federal laws. It is simply no longer the case that consumer pro-
tection is the exclusive province of state legislatures; nor is it the 
case that consumers have always been better protected by state ra-
ther than federal legislatures. This reality no doubt lies behind the 
comfort that courts faced with recent preemption cases have felt with 
the position that “[c]onsumer protection is not reflected in the case 
law as an area in which states have traditionally been permitted to 
regulate national banks,”223 laying the groundwork for the reversal of 
the presumption against preemption of state laws dealing with con-
sumer protection in banking services.224  
 The federalization of consumer protection law in banking services 
does not necessarily have to entail substantive deregulation. Allega-
tions of predatory mortgage lending led Congress to enact the Home 
                                                                                                                     
 218. Both of these laws were enacted as Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1500 (1974). The 
Fair Credit Billing Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666-666j (2000), and the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (2000). 
 219. Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-692o (2000)). 
 220. Schiltz, supra note 12, at 535. 
 221. See id. at 528-33. 
 222. See id. at 529 n.38. 
 223. Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Lockyer, 239 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1016 (E.D. Cal. 2002). 
 224. Id. (citing Bank of Am. v. San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551, 559 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
930  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:893 
 
Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994,225 which imposed 
greater disclosure and substantive limits on the terms of subprime 
mortgage loans.226 Indeed, the current Congress, in reaction to the 
recent turbulence in the mortgage market, is considering numerous 
proposals for substantive regulation of consumer credit markets.227 
Thus, the argument that the content of consumer protection laws at 
the state level is necessarily more robust than consumer protection 
laws at the federal level is not compelling. Congress is fully capable 
of enacting more substantive consumer protection laws any time it 
chooses to do so. 
 The procedural argument that the regulatory will to enforce exist-
ing laws is more robust at the state level than at the federal level is 
subject to debate. The federal banking regulators argue that the 
strict oversight to which national banks are subject renders them 
significantly less prone to engaging in egregiously predatory banking 
practices than nonbanks engaged in consumer banking activities.228 
Indeed, the Congressional Research Services recently released a 
study supporting this contention in the context of the mortgage bank-
ing crisis.229 The federal banking regulators also point to the escalat-
ing volume of enforcement actions for infractions of consumer law in 
the past.230 In fact, Congress has begun to respond to the OCC’s peti-
tion for more legal authority to impose and enforce consumer protec-
tion regulations.231 And at least one federal regulator, the Federal 
                                                                                                                     
 225. Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2160 (1994). 
 226. See ELIZABETH RENUART & KATHLEEN KEEST, THE COST OF CREDIT, § 12.2.2 (3d 
ed. 2005) (detailing coverage and content of the Home Ownership and Equity Protection 
Act of 1994). 
 227. See sources cited supra note 9. 
 228. Improving Federal Consumer Protection in Financial Services: Hearing Before the 
H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 110th Cong. 14-16 (2007) (statement of John C. Dugan, 
Comptroller of the Currency) [hereinafter Dugan Testimony]. 
 229. EDWARD V. MURPHY, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR 
CONGRESS: SECURITIZATION AND FEDERAL REGULATION OF MORTGAGES FOR SAFETY AND 
SOUNDNESS (2007), available at http://opencrs.com/rpts/RS22722_20070917.pdf. 
 230. Recent Events in the Credit and Mortgage Markets: Hearing Before the H. Comm. 
on Financial Servs., 110th Cong. (2007) (testimony of John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the 
Currency); Dugan Testimony, supra note 228; Improving Federal Consumer Protection in 
Financial Services: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 110th Cong. 16-17 
(2007) (statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, FDIC) [hereinafter Bair Testimony]. But see 
sources cited supra note 209 (arguing that federal regulators lack the will to strictly en-
force consumer protection laws). 
 231. Dugan Testimony, supra note 228; see also Bair Testimony, supra note 230, at 7. 
House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank has stated: “We can’t undo 
preemption—that is just . . . a practical fact. But what we have to do is make sure [the 
regulators] are able to carry out the consumer protection function that they have pre-
empted from the states.” Cheyenne Hopkins, Democrats Eye Bill as High Court Backs 
OCC, AM. BANKER, Apr. 18, 2007, at 1. The House Financial Services Committee approved 
H.R. 3526, a bill that would give the OCC and the FDIC rulemaking power under the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act to identify and prohibit unfair or deceptive practices for the in-
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Reserve Board of Governors, has recently responded to the reports of 
abusive lending practices surfacing in the wake of the collapse of the 
subprime mortgage market by proposing prohibitions on particularly 
abusive practices for mortgage loans232 and credit card loans.233 
 However, even if Congress shared the critics’ assessment of the 
federal banking agencies’ will to enforce consumer protection laws, 
Congress could act to remedy the situation. Indeed, there is a histori-
cal precedent for such an action by Congress. In legislation passed by 
Congress in 1991 in the wake of the savings and loan crisis of the 
1980s, Congress effectively legislated agency “will to enforce.” The ul-
timate cost of the savings and loan crisis was exacerbated by regula-
tory agencies’ reluctance to close down thrifts that were technically 
insolvent, largely due to political pressure to avoid the embarrass-
ment of admitting their failures of oversight.234 In response, Congress 
enacted a specific, mandatory scheme of enforcement actions that 
federal regulators must take when capital levels of financial institu-
tions fall below certain levels.235 If Congress were skeptical of the will 
of the federal agencies to enforce particular substantive federal con-
sumer protection it might enact, it certainly has the power to draft 
laws bolstering the regulatory “will” to enforce such schemes. 
 In conclusion, the federal preemption of state consumer protection 
law in banking services is not inevitably deregulatory. The federali-
zation of consumer banking law was arguably spurred more directly 
by a desire to facilitate the nationalization of markets for consumer 
banking services than by a conscious desire to deregulate, though the 
national banks benefitting from this deregulation no doubt appreci-
ated both effects. Although the current paradigm for federal regula-
tion of financial services is primarily one of disclosure rather than 
substantive regulation, that paradigm could change. 
 Congress could, if it chose to, impose substantive regulation of 
consumer banking services offered by all national banks and could 
enact measures ensuring robust enforcement of those regulations. 
Indeed, the current crisis in the mortgage banking markets and per-
                                                                                                                     
stitutions under their jurisdiction. R. Christian Bruce, House Financial Services Panel 
Clears Bill Giving FDIC, OCC Power to Write UDAP Rules, 89 BANK. REP. 437 (2007). 
 232. Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 1672 (proposed Jan. 9, 2008) (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. pt. 226). 
 233. Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,904 (May 19, 2008) (to be 
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 535); Truth in Savings, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,739 (May 19, 2008) (to be 
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 234. MCCOY, supra note 128, at § 15.02. For a concise history of the savings and loan 
crisis, see Jonathan R. Macey, Commercial Banking and Democracy: The Illusive Quest for 
Deregulation, 23 YALE J. REG. 1, 11-17 (2006). 
 235. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (2000)). 
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ception of unfairness in credit card terms might just provide Con-
gress the impetus to do so. However, congressional reaction to par-
ticular financial crises once they begin to affect commercial securities 
markets is unlikely to afford consumers well-considered, effective 
schemes of protection in the long run. Moreover, the congressional 
inclination to regulate or deregulate industry groups is likely to be as 
strongly influenced by political considerations as by rational consid-
erations of what level of regulation strikes the optimal balance be-
tween regulation or deregulation.236 A potential counterbalance to 
this political pressure can arguably be identified in the more com-
petitive mechanism of the dual banking system, which might more 
effectively ensure, over the long run, an appropriate balance of regu-
lation and deregulation in the banking services area.  
B.   Consequences of Federal Preemption of State Consumer Banking 
Laws for the Dual Banking System 
 On a practical level, there is no doubt that the power to preempt 
inconsistent state laws provides a significant advantage to the na-
tional bank charter. If similar power is not extended to state banks, 
the value of the state bank charter is clearly eroded. A significantly 
less attractive state banking charter poses a threat to the continued 
vitality of the dual banking system.237 Indeed, the dissenting justices 
in Watters specifically identify as the reason for their extensive dis-
sent, “[t]he significant impact of the Court’s decision on the federal-
state balance and the dual banking system.”238 
 However, preemption of state consumer banking laws is not the 
only reason for the decline of the value in the state bank charter. Far 
more significant has been the gradual regulatory homogenization of 
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all bank charters over the past few decades.239 Because of the increas-
ing amounts of federal regulation to which state banks are subjected 
and the growing lack of any meaningful difference between the pow-
ers of state banks as opposed to national banks, there are fewer and 
fewer substantive distinctions between the two charters. As Profes-
sor Scott noted over thirty years ago (before the large-scale homog-
enization of bank powers), “[t]he very core of the dual banking sys-
tem is the simultaneous existence of different regulatory options that 
are not alike in terms of statutory provisions, regulatory implemen-
tation and administrative policy.”240 The weaker the strength of that 
core principle, the weaker the resulting system. Extending even 
broader preemption powers to facilitate more comprehensively uni-
form interstate operations for national banks but not for state banks 
constitutes another significant blow to the continued vitality of an al-
ready seriously weakened dual banking system.241 
 Is there any reason that Congress should be concerned with this 
particular blow—struck as it has been in the context of preemption of 
state consumer laws—when it has not been troubled by the more 
general homogenization of bank regulation and bank powers in the 
preceding decades? Rather than responding to this particular threat 
to the dual banking system, should Congress simply allow the system 
to continue on its path toward a “natural death” by attrition from the 
state banking system?242 A careful look at the arguments presented 
generally for the preservation of the dual banking system reveals a 
recent shift in the tenor of these arguments. This shift can be tied to 
the different contexts in which the arguments are being made—the 
context of restrictions on bank powers imposed by state consumer 
protection laws, rather than the earlier context of increasing bank 
powers. The shift in focus arguably reveals an argument for preserv-
ing the dual banking system that is likely to have greater resonance 
with Congress than arguments made in the past.  
 The dual banking system is in one sense, as Professor Miller has 
noted, “highly anomalous.”243 He points out: 
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Virtually all private business enterprises, other than depository 
institutions, are chartered at the state level. Federal chartering is 
generally reserved for enterprises that are partially or wholly de-
voted to serving a governmental interest. Yet in banking we see a 
very different pattern, one of federal chartering of institutions that 
are both privately owned and devoted to the pursuit of profit for 
the owners.244 
Adding to the anomaly of even having a federal system of chartering 
for private institutions, we also have the anomaly of preserving the 
arguably redundant parallel state system of chartering. 
 In another sense, though, the dual banking system is simply a 
specific manifestation of the fundamentally federalist sensibilities 
that underlie our nation. At the most basic level, our federalist sys-
tem recognizes the value of state governments as a locus of authority 
that constrains the centralized power of the federal government. 
There are two arguments for why state governments are typically 
considered to operate to provide such constraints. The first argument 
is based on the advantages of competition—states can offer alterna-
tives that, if proven superior, can serve to reform the federal model. 
Pursuant to this argument, states are often characterized as “labora-
tories of democracy,” where smaller-scale social experiments can be 
tested and incubated. If successful, the innovations bred at the state 
level can be adopted to reform the entire nation, either through fed-
eral action or through uniform state adoption.245 The second argu-
ment is based on the principle of subsidiarity.246 In its most general 
terms, “[s]ubsidiarity expresses a preference for governance at the 
most local level consistent with achieving government’s stated pur-
poses.”247 This principle underlies the federalist structures of govern-
ance in place in the European Union as well as in the United 
States.248 It is the aspect of American federalism that holds that state 
governments, as decentralized units of governing that are closer to 
the people being governed, are considered to be more responsive and 
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accountable to their constituents, and thus governments in which 
“democratic ideals are more fully realized.”249 
 These same basic categories of arguments are applied in the bank-
ing area to justify maintaining the dual banking system. The gener-
alized American mistrust of centralized power that motivates pre-
serving some decentralized locus of power is typically expressed in 
the banking context as apprehension about the concentration of fi-
nancial power in the hands of any one bank or even any one bank-
ing system.250 
 The most commonly articulated defense for maintaining the dual 
banking system as a mechanism for resisting total centralization is 
the competitive argument.251 While there is significant debate over 
how well competition among the two regulatory schemes, as cur-
rently constituted, in fact operates,252 commentators from all perspec-
tives invariably agree that genuine regulatory competition in theory 
ought to produce the optimum scheme of banking regulation over 
time.253 The state banking system is often characterized as the locus 
of “laboratories of reform” in the banking area, leading to innovation 
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ing laws. 
Id. at 713; see also Miller, supra note 243, at 14-15. 
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in banking services and forms of regulation.254 Examples of innova-
tions in banking now common to national and state banks that origi-
nated as unique state powers include deposit insurance; automated 
teller machines (ATM); NOW accounts; interstate bank acquisitions; 
and securities, insurance, and real estate lending powers.255 While 
these arguments for the dual banking system based on the states’ in-
novation have largely focused on providing banks with more powers, 
more recently these arguments have begun to focus on restricting 
bank powers through consumer protection regulations.256 Diana Tay-
lor, who at the time was the New York Superintendent of Banks, re-
cently testified before Congress on behalf of the Conference of State 
Bank Supervisors that  
[t]he traditional dynamic of the dual banking system has been that 
the states experiment with new products and services that Con-
gress later enacts on a nationwide basis. We generally discuss this 
history in terms of expanded powers, but the states have been in-
novators in the area of consumer protection as, well. . . . If you lose 
the states as a laboratory for consumer protections and other inno-
vations you lose a great attribute of our federalist system—the 
ability to find out what does and doesn’t work.257 
 Notably absent from most defenses of the dual banking system, 
until very recently, have been arguments based on the subsidiarity 
principle used to justify other manifestations of our federalist sys-
tem. These would be the arguments based on the desire to preserve a 
locus of authority that is local for various related reasons, including: 
1) that it is closer to the concerns of, and more directly accountable 
to, the citizens258 and 2) that local governments can be more respon-
sive “to local conditions and local tastes.”259 More recently, however, 
such arguments have begun to find their way into the debate over 
preemption of state consumer protection laws.  
 For example, the Tenth Amendment arguments ultimately re-
jected by the Supreme Court in Watters focus not on the competitive 
rationale for the dual banking system, but rather on “preserving 
state sovereignty from excessive federal regulation.”260 Critics of pre-
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emption have begun to stress the subsidiarity argument more gener-
ally as well. Professor Peterson argued that the OCC’s Preemption 
Regulations and Visitorial Regulation 
are controversial, not merely because the recent rash of fraudu-
lent, deceptive, and unconscionable lending has had a corrosive ef-
fect on minority communities, senior citizens, and the entire lower 
middle class. Rather, their controversy lies in the fact that democ-
ratically-elected state representatives all across the country re-
sponded to their constituents’ demands by adopting such legisla-
tion, and no federal statute had ever explicitly authorized the un-
elected beltway banking custodians to dismiss these state con-
sumer protection laws.261 
Touching on the democratic accountability aspect of the subsidiarity 
argument, Peterson in another article reminded readers that, “[t]he 
comptroller of the currency does not stand for election, lives in Wash-
ington, D.C., serves as a partisan appointment, and is closely tied to 
one of the most powerful industries in the country.”262 
 Consumer protection regulation touches the heart of what is at 
stake in the subsidiarity argument in support of the dual banking 
system to a much greater degree than regulation of the types of ser-
vices that banks can offer, the geographic reach of their operations, 
or safety and soundness regulations. Consumer protection regula-
tions, by their very nature, protect individual citizens from otherwise 
unrestrained power of the corporate entities offering banking ser-
vices. The consequences of the presence or absence of consumer pro-
tection regulations, whether good or bad, are more directly experi-
enced by the citizenry than the consequences of the presence or ab-
sence of a particular bank power. The ability of that citizenry to ac-
curately assess whether those consequences are good or bad in the 
long run is not the point here; the point is that the citizenry is more 
likely to be aware of, to care about, and to hold government responsi-
ble for the presence or absence of consumer protection regulations 
than regulations of bank powers, geographic restrictions, or safety 
and soundness regulations. Thus, it is not surprising that the sub-
sidiarity argument for the preservation of the dual banking system is 
particularly resonant in the context of the consumer protection de-
bate. 
 Moreover, the types of predatory practices that are the target of 
most significant consumer protection regulation in banking services 
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are often practices with unique local characteristics.263 States and lo-
cal municipalities will often be in a better position to accurately as-
sess how these local variations affect the appropriate balance be-
tween regulation and deregulation to protect consumers without re-
stricting access to banking services. In the context of predatory lend-
ing, for example: 
empirical evidence suggests that the predatory lending problem in 
urban areas with large minority communities is different than the 
problem that exists in areas where such communities do not exist. 
The predatory lending problem in urban, minority communities 
results from the higher rate of subprime lending that occurs in 
those areas. By contrast, the problem in Utah, for example, is 
much different. Although many borrowers in Utah are being sad-
dled with loans they cannot handle—a common practice among 
predatory lenders—the fraud in that jurisdiction often includes 
participation by the borrowers themselves, who assist mortgage 
brokers in the inflation of incomes and other such practices in or-
der to be approved for a home they could not otherwise afford. 
Problems faced in various jurisdictions require a distinct regula-
tory response.264 
The subsidiarity argument that local authority should not be super-
seded by federal authority where the local solution is preferable is 
thus particularly compelling in this situation. There are many in-
stances in which federal solutions (imposed through preemption) fail 
to address local variations in practices and needs of the community. 
For these reasons, it is not surprising that the subsidiarity argument 
for the preservation of the dual banking system should have a reso-
nance in the context of the recent preemption of state consumer laws 
that is stronger than that experienced in prior preemption skir-
mishes involving bank powers or geographical expansion. 
 Most commentators debating the wisdom of maintaining the dual 
banking system have, until recently, tended to focus exclusively on 
different aspects of the competitive arguments. While coming to dif-
ferent conclusions about whether competition is, in fact, effectively 
creating the optimal system of banking regulation,265 most seem to 
concede that, politically, the dual banking system is remarkably du-
rable. The dual banking system is characterized as “a sacred cow in 
the American political tradition,”266 “an object of almost universal ve-
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neration,”267 and the object of “such widespread political support 
among regulators and politicians” that its premises are rarely ques-
tioned.268 What this focus on the competitive argument has perhaps 
obscured is that the reason for the political durability of the dual 
banking system lies in the subsidiarity rationale rather than the 
competitiveness rationale. Ultimately, for politicians who are regu-
larly held accountable to their constituents in elections, the subsidi-
arity arguments might be more compelling than the competitive ar-
guments. Since the subsidiarity arguments are more directly impli-
cated in the consumer protection area, it is possible that they will ob-
tain more purchase with Congress than the competitive arguments 
raised in past debates about the preservation of the dual banking 
system dealing with bank powers or other structural issues. It is also 
possible that the broadscale preemption of laws governing consumer 
banking services described earlier in this Article and ratified by the 
Supreme Court in Watters will prompt intervention by Congress to 
reassert the competitive equality between the federal and state bank-
ing systems. 
IV.   CHANNELING THE POWER OF PREEMPTION TO PROTECT 
CONSUMERS AND PRESERVE THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM 
 The complete preemption of state consumer protection laws in 
banking services clearly constitutes a victory for those who believe 
that national banks should be permitted to offer their services on 
consistent terms throughout the country, regardless of where their 
customers happen to reside. It also constitutes a victory for those 
who favor a minimum of substantive regulation of the terms under 
which such services may be offered, since the current framework of 
federal regulation of banking services is largely one of regulation by 
disclosure, rather than substantive restrictions. At the same time, 
however, preemption constitutes a severe blow to the state banking 
system, and thus to the continued vitality of the dual banking sys-
tem, since state banks are operating under the significant competi-
tive disadvantage by not having the power to offer their services on 
the same consistent terms throughout the country.  
 Neither the current framework of federal regulation of banking 
services, nor the current state of disequilibrium in the dynamic of the 
dual banking system, are set in stone. As I have argued above, the 
preemption initiatives on behalf of national banks were arguably mo-
tivated as much, if not more, by a recognition of the nationalization 
of the markets for banking services than by the desire to deregulate. 
That nationalization applies equally to state banks. Therefore, it is 
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arguable that, in the spirit of the competitive equality dynamic of in-
novation historically displayed in the dual banking system,269 this 
same preemption power ought to be extended to state banks, in rec-
ognition of the nationalization of the markets for banking services, 
rather than out of a desire to deregulate. 
 In reaction to the current mortgage crisis and perceived abuses in 
terms offered by credit card companies, Congress currently is evi-
dencing some inclination to explore whether more substantive con-
sumer credit regulation is appropriate at the federal level.270 I believe 
that Congress should take the opportunity to consider more broadly 
whether the current approach to consumer protection in banking 
services generally presents the best mechanism for ensuring the 
proper mix of regulation and deregulation, particularly in light of 
Watters’ upheaval of the historic presumptions guiding this area.  
 A possible starting point for such a deliberation could be a recent 
proposal of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The 
FDIC is the primary federal regulator of most state banks as a con-
sequence of its authority over the federal deposit insurance fund to 
which all state banks must belong.271 Shortly after the promulgation 
of the Preemption Regulations, the FDIC, acting on a petition from 
the Financial Services Roundtable, proposed for comment a regula-
tion codifying for state banks preemption powers analogous to those 
granted national banks.272 The rule published for comment by the 
FDIC would do two things. First, it would codify its more informal 
positions that grant state banks interest rate exportation powers co-
extensive with those granted to national banks under Section 85 of 
the NBA and subsequent OCC regulations.273 Second, it would inter-
pret provisions of Riegle-Neal that give interstate branches of state 
banks the power to preempt host state laws in such a way as to quite 
specifically piggyback (albeit not fully) on analogous preemption 
powers extended by the OCC to national banks branching across 
state lines.274 This part of the proposal provides:  
A host state law does not apply to an activity conducted at a 
branch in the host State of an out-of-State, State bank to the same 
extent that a Federal court or the Office of the Comptroller of the 
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Currency has determined in writing that the particular host State 
law does not apply to an activity conducted at a branch in the host 
State of an out-of-State, national bank.275 
The proposal defines activities conducted at a branch quite gener-
ously to include any “activity of, by, through, in, from, or substan-
tially involving, a branch.”276 
 The FDIC’s proposal was open for public comment from October 
through December 2005.277 It generated a flurry of comments but has 
not been acted on, either to withdraw it or to move forward on it, 
since it was promulgated.278 Although the lack of activity may reflect 
the diversion of the FDIC’s attention to other higher-profile issues 
(such as the mortgage crisis and Wal-Mart’s application for federal 
deposit insurance for a Utah industrial loan corporation279), it is like-
ly that it also reflects the fact that the proposal was intended to pro-
voke discussion about the growing imbalance in the preemption pow-
ers of national banks as opposed to state banks, particularly in light 
of the OCC Preemption Regulation.  
 It is not likely that the FDIC believes it has the statutory author-
ity to assert the broad preemption power that this proposal would 
grant to state banks without some congressional action. In contrast 
to the OCC’s preemption rule, the FDIC’s rule, if promulgated, has 
no chance of withstanding judicial challenge for many reasons. First, 
the FDIC’s backup supervisory role as the insurer of state-chartered 
banks is in no way analogous to the OCC’s role as the charterer and 
supervisor of national banks. State banks are chartered and primar-
ily supervised by their individual state’s banking supervisor.280 When 
a state bank applies for federal deposit insurance (as required by 
most states), the FDIC acquires some authority as federal supervisor 
of that bank, but that authority is essentially a backup, rather than 
primary, supervisory authority over that bank.281 In contrast to the 
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OCC, Congress has never charged the FDIC with the authority for 
creating a uniform nationwide banking system in which state banks 
can operate efficiently.  
 This distinction between the roles of these two regulators is re-
flected in the complete lack of anything close to the case law history 
of Chevron deference that the courts have extended to the OCC’s in-
terpretations of the NBA. Indeed, the Supreme Court denied certio-
rari in a First Circuit decision upholding the FDIC’s authority to 
adopt a definition of “interest” as expansive as the OCC’s definition 
upheld in Smiley,282 even though that authority was arguably based 
on the FDIC’s authority to interpret the definition of the term “inter-
est” in the federal statute giving state banks the authority to export 
interest rates in the same manner as national banks.283  
 Furthermore, the FDIC’s attempt to expand the preemption pow-
ers of state banks does not have the same constitutional authority as 
the OCC’s efforts. The OCC is effecting preemption of state laws by 
federal laws, under the operation of the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution.284 Although the content of the federal law creating the 
preemption is sometimes provided by the law of the state where the 
national bank is located, federal law is preempting state law. In con-
trast, under the FDIC’s proposal, state banking laws of one state 
would be preempting state consumer laws of another state. There is 
no authority under the Constitution for sister-state preemption. Of 
course, if Congress were to enact a federal law that gave state banks 
broader preemption rights as a matter of federal law, the Supremacy 
Clause arguments would be available to support the constitutionality 
of that preemption, even if the content of the preempting law might 
be furnished by state law.285 In other words, Congress has the power 
to do what the FDIC is attempting to do by regulation.  
 If Congress does, for the reasons outlined above, want to maintain 
a vital dual banking system, it is usually presented as having two 
basic choices—to take some preemption power away from the na-
tional banks or to give the same preemption power to the state 
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banks. The first option will certainly be opposed by the national 
banks, and the second option is opposed equally as forcefully by 
about half of the state attorneys general who have commented on the 
FDIC’s proposal (including the attorneys general of California, Con-
necticut, Illinois, Iowa, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, and 
Vermont)286 as well as the Banking Commissioners of Connecticut, 
Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and 
Vermont.287 The opponents articulate sound reasons for their opposi-
tion, including concerns about the “race to the regulatory bottom” by 
states seeking charters,288 the inability of states to protect their citi-
zens from unscrupulous out-of-state banks,289 and the unmanageable 
confusion confronting consumers faced with financial service provid-
ers exporting potentially fifty different sets of laws into any one s-
tate.290 
 However, I think that these opponents of state bank preemption 
powers need to consider the consequence of not extending the same 
sort of preemption power to state banks—the inability of their state-
chartered institutions to compete on a nationwide basis in the provi-
sion of banking services. The potentially devastating consequences of 
this to the continued vitality of the state banking system need to be 
taken seriously. I think it is time to consider the possibility of chan-
neling the power of preemption for state as well as federal banks, in 
recognition of the reality that geographic limitations are no longer 
meaningful in the provision of banking services. However, if this 
channeling of the power of preemption to state banks is to also pre-
serve the vitality of the competitive dynamic of the dual banking sys-
tem, it will be crucial to recognize that preemption need not neces-
sarily entail deregulation. 
 The preemption of state interest rate regulation by the expansion 
of the Exportation Doctrine described above291 was extended to state 
banks by congressional fiat.292 This simple extension of preemption 
                                                                                                                     
 286. Letter from Eliot Spitzer, Attorney Gen. of NY, to Robert E. Feldman, Executive 
Sec’y, FDIC (May 16, 2005), available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/2005/ 
05c6petition.pdf [hereinafter NY AG Letter]; Letter from Bill Lockyer, Attorney Gen. of 
Cal., to Robert E. Feldman, Executive Sec’y, FDIC (May 18, 2005), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/2005/05c13petition.html.  
 287. Letter from John P. Burke et al., Banking Regulators, to Robert E. Feldman, Ex-
ecutive Sec’y, FDIC (Dec. 13, 2005), available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/ 
2005/05c9petition.pdf [hereinafter Bank Regulators Letter]. 
 288. See NY AG Letter, supra note 286, at 7; Bank Regulators Letter, supra note 287, 
at 2. 
 289. See NY AG Letter, supra note 286, at 7-8; Bank Regulators Letter, supra note 
287, at 2. 
 290. See NY AG Letter, supra note 286, at 8-9. 
 291. See supra Part II.A. 
 292. 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) (2000); Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act of 1980, § 521, Pub. L. No. 96-221; see also Schiltz, supra note 12, at 565-67. 
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power to state banks without any limitations did, indeed, contribute 
to the well-documented “race to the bottom” in state regulation of in-
terest rates,293 as states competed to attract banks desiring to export 
the lack of regulation. This pattern is not, however, inevitable. 
 A possible variation on this pattern could be effected if Congress 
were to consciously decouple preemption from deregulation by condi-
tioning broad exportation and preemption powers by national banks 
on some basic threshold of consumer protection requirements and by 
extending analogous exportation and preemption powers to state 
banks chartered in jurisdictions meeting or exceeding those same 
consumer protection thresholds. The basic threshold of federal con-
sumer protection laws could remain focused on disclosure or could in-
clude some substantive restrictions. More important for purposes of 
this proposal is that Congress preserve the right of state banks to of-
fer an alternative to the federal level of consumer protection in bank-
ing services. 
 To do this, Congress would have to partially reverse Watters. Con-
gress would have to reassert its mandate in Riegle-Neal that con-
sumer protection laws be recognized as being of particular interest to 
state governments.294 It would do so not by subjecting national banks 
to state consumer banking laws, but by preserving the possibility 
that state banks subject to a different, state-determined set of con-
sumer protection laws can compete on a nationwide basis with na-
tional banks. Preserving this regulatory power for the states, while 
at the same time extending the preemption power to state banks 
whose states chose to offer a distinct approach to consumer banking 
services, would present a possible bulwark against the complete ho-
mogenization of the federal and state banking systems. A national 
banking system could compete nationwide with a state banking sys-
tem, and both could offer different levels of consumer protection. 
 Whether this possibility would, indeed, revitalize the dual bank-
ing system would depend largely on whether the states in fact re-
sisted the race to the bottom by consciously competing with national 
banks by enacting and aggressively promoting the advantages of 
banking services coming from consumer-friendly regulatory regimes. 
As geographic location continues its slide into irrelevance in the 
choice of providers of banking services, the niche of customers willing 
to choose banking service providers based on a state “seal,” as it 
were, of consumer protection could be cultivated.  
 Recent studies of behavioral economists and others are beginning 
to suggest, at the very least, strong consumer reactions to particular 
                                                                                                                     
 293. Schiltz, supra note 12, at 568, 619-20. 
 294. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
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types of credit terms,295 sales pitches,296 and perceptions of the safety 
of particular products.297 These studies indicate that consumers are 
sensitive to credit terms in addition to rates; features seen as en-
hancing the safety of a product might be more important to some 
consumers than the rate alone. For example, in one recent study of 
low-income credit card users, they were found to be willing to accept 
high interest rates in order to preserve access to credit, but would 
prefer credit cards with terms such as low but inviolable credit limits 
or options to convert credit card debt into installment debt.298 These 
studies suggest that a market in regulated consumer services might 
realistically compete with a market in unregulated or minimally-
regulated consumer banking services. If the only market that exists 
is a uniform, national, unregulated market, consumers will never 
have the opportunity to demonstrate such a preference. With some 
congressional support in giving state banks the power to compete na-
tionally, and with the conscious rejection of preemption as always en-
tailing deregulation, the states could continue serving as the labora-
tories of reform and the responsive units of democratic accountability 
that underlie the vision of a robust dual banking system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 295. See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1395-1408 (2004); 
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